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I. INTRODUCTION
Espionage among nations is an exceptionally old and extensive
human endeavor. In times of war and peace, a generous slice of
states’ resources are allocated to intelligence organizations.1 Foreign
espionage also involves considerable moral harm.2 One would then
expect to find that espionage is anchored in solid moral and legal
underpinnings. Surprisingly, this costly and harmful activity lacks a
clear justification. Legal and philosophical scholarship seeks to
understand the legitimacy of war among nations, and the proper legal
framework for regulating war.3 Scholars also rigorously debate the
legitimacy of the domestic use of governmental force.4 Yet when it
comes to espionage, moral theorists are as soundless as spies. If
espionage is discussed, it is generally perceived as an extra-moral

1. See STEPHEN DAGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21945, THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE BUDGET: A BASIC OVERVIEW 2-3 (2004) (finding that the United
States Central Intelligence Agency’s budget had increased over $13 billion from
1996 to 2004); Ken Dilanian, Overall U.S. Intelligence Budget Tops $80 Billion,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/28/nation/la-naintel-budget-20101029 (stating that the United States’ annual intelligence budget
increased threefold over twelve years to $80.1 billion in 2010); Dana Priest &
William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST, Jul.
19, 2010, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hiddenworld-growing-beyond-control/1/ (reporting on unprecedented resources which the
United States allocated to espionage practices in the War On Terror).
2. See John P. Langan, Moral Damages and the Justification of Intelligence
Collection from Human Sources, in ETHICS OF SPYING: A READER FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL 104-05 (Jan Goldman ed., 2006) (exploring the
effect or “moral damage” that the actions of agents to collection intelligence have
on the agents themselves); Ross Bellaby, What’s the Harm? The Ethics of
Intelligence Collection, 27 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 93, 93 (2012) (referencing
Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, extrordinary renditions programs, and the
surveillance state as examples of the moral harm of intelligence).
3. For two prominent, pivotal sources out of an extensive literature on the
justifiability of war and killing in war, see generally JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN
WAR vii (2009) (challenging the concept of just war); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST
AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS xi–
xvii, 325–27 (1997) (concluding that war may be justified even in a moral world).
4. See generally Russell Hardin, Rationally Justifying Political Coercion, 15
J. PHIL. RES. 79, 87-89 (1989).
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activity, one that goes beyond the boundaries of ethics.5 Espionage is
frequently associated with a murky sphere in which the gravitational
pull of states’ supreme interests bends the standard contours of moral
space. This article aims to answer one primary question: what is the
appropriate ethical justification for espionage? This justification
should underpin the body of law that regulates espionage.
The article’s account of international espionage begins from the
observation that states restrict access to various spaces that serve as
points of access to information and that espionage seeks to penetrate
such spaces to collect information. Espionage between states is
therefore an undercover state-sponsored intrusion into the restricted
space of another state or organization for the sake of collecting
information.6 Access to a given space can be restricted in many
ways, including—but not limited to—physically, visually,
5. See Angela Gendron, Just War, Just Intelligence: An Ethical Framework
for Foreign Espionage, 18 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTER INTELLIGENCE 398,
402 (2005) [hereinafter Gendron, Just War] (offering a just war based framework
for inter-state espionage).
6. On various approaches to defining espionage, see generally SHERMAN
KENT, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN WORLD POLICY, at vii (1953)
[hereinafter KENT, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE] (describing vital intelligence as
“vital for national survival”); MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM
SECRETS TO POLICY 1–2 (2009); Martin T. Bimfort, A Definition of Intelligence, 2
STUD. INTELLIGENCE 75 (1958) (compiling definitions of strategic intelligence
from varied sources and explaining intelligence as the state-gathering of
information from foreign nations for the sake of foreign policy and national
security); Thomas J. Troy, The “Correct” Definition of Intelligence, 5 INT’L J.
INTELLIGENCE & COUNTER INTELLIGENCE 433, 433 (1991) (defining intelligence
as “knowledge of the enemy”). But see VERNON A. WALTERS, SILENT MISSIONS
621 (1978) (describing intelligence as information on the “strength, resources,
capabilities, and intentions of a foreign country”); Sherman Kent, Prospects for the
National Intelligence as a Science, 36 YALE REV. 116, 117-118 (1946) [hereinafter
Kent, Prospects for the National Intelligence] (defining intelligence as both a
process of surveillance and an end-product of knowledge); Michael Warner,
Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”, 46 STUD. INTELLIGENCE 15, 15 (2002),
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html (commenting that there is
not yet a concrete definition for strategic intelligence gathering but that creating a
standard definition may aid policy decisions and transparency). Consider, too,
Shulsky’s reference to Random, who identifies secrecy as a common feature of
intelligence. ABRAM N. SHULSKY, SILENT WARFARE: UNDERSTANDING THE
WORLD OF INTELLIGENCE 171-76 (2002); R.A. Random, Intelligence as a Science,
2 STUD. INTELLIGENCE 76 (1958).

1012

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:5

acoustically, digitally, and legally.7 An intrusion into a restricted
space can be achieved through any known method of espionage,
whether human or technological.8
7. On the definition of spying in international law, see the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 46, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (defining a spy as “[a] member of the armed forces of a
Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in territory controlled by an
adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as
engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed
forces”); Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Annex, art. 29, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (defining spies as “acting clandestinely
or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of
operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile
party”). On the domestic legal perception of spying, see Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (2006) (defining criminal espionage as providing
information to a foreign entity with intent or reason to believe that it will injure the
United States or advantage a foreign nation); Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§
792-99 (2006) (expanding the definition of espionage beyond international
standards); Penal Law, 5737–1977, §§ 111–16, LSI (Special Vol.) 49 (1978) (Isr.)
(creating degrees of criminality for espionage based on the intent with which the
individual acted and the potential harmfulness of the action); Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, §§ 26–30 (U.K.) (providing state agencies
the ability to conduct surveillance with limits to homes and vehicles). It would
seem, however, that the legal definition of spying is constantly expanding when
domestic criminal courts review it. The Quirin case, for instance, focuses on
clandestine activity regardless of whether information is collected. See Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45–47 (1942). The Israeli Vaanunu and Gil cases reflect an
accelerated expansion of the criminal legal definition of spying. Vaanunu was
prosecuted for spying even though an enemy never recruited or handled him and
his actions were not clandestine. CrimA 172/88 Vaanunu v. State of Israel 44(3)
PD 265 [1990] (Isr.). Gil’s case is a particularly extreme example. He was
convicted of spying and sentenced to five years in prison because, as a handler, he
communicated false information to his superiors that he did not actually receive
from his agent. CrimA 3166/99 Gil v. State of Israel 54(4) PD 193 [2000] (Isr.). In
contrast to the intuitive and commonplace definition of espionage, Gil was
prosecuted for bringing information into the state, rather than for communicating it
out. Id.
8. For an account of the various methods available for the gathering and the
use of intelligence, see generally MICHAEL HERMAN, INTELLIGENCE POWER IN
PEACE AND WAR 2 (1996) [hereinafter HERMAN, INTELLIGENCE POWER]
(discussing the impact of intelligence on the development of technology);
REGINALD VICTOR JONES, MOST SECRET WAR: BRITISH SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
1939-1945 45 (1979); WALTER LAQUEUR, A WORLD OF SECRETS: THE USES AND
LIMITS OF INTELLIGENCE 3–12, 311-17 (1985) (discussing the role of intelligence
in shaping policy and what the future of intelligence); RICHARD A. POSNER,
PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 1–
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Throughout the argument, the article distinguishes between
espionage during states of emergency, such as war or conflict, and
espionage during peacetime or ordinary circumstances. An
“emergency” refers a time that calls for remedial action to address a
clear, imminent, and serious threat posed by one state against a basic
interest of another.9 War is a classic state of emergency.10 An explicit
threat of war creates an emergency as well. Another more indirect
example of an emergency is where State A learns from open sources
that its neighbor, State B, plans to attack it. By definition, in
“peacetime,” State A has no indication that State B is planning any
harmful action against it.11 Espionage that is undertaken in response
to emergencies can be sufficiently justified by reference to Just War
Theory (“JWT”) and the rules of necessity and self-defense.
Peacetime espionage poses the real justificatory challenge.
This article offers a new theoretical justification for peacetime
espionage among nations. It consists of three parts. Part II analyzes
15 (2005) [hereinafter POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS] (discussing
reform of U.S. intelligence mechanisms after review by the 9/11 Commission);
JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, A CENTURY OF SPIES: INTELLIGENCE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1995) [hereinafter RICHELSON, A CENTURY OF SPIES]; JEFFREY T.
RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 2-3 (1999) [hereinafter
RICHELSON, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY] (discussing intelligence,
counterintelligence, and covert action); ROBERT A. SAYRe, JR., SOME PRINCIPLES
OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND THEIR APPLICATION 2-3 (2004) (discussing human
intelligence); Matthew M. Aid & Cees Wiebes, Introduction to the Importance of
Signals Intelligence in the Cold War, 16 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 1
(2001) (discussing the role and importance of Signals Intelligence by the United
States during World War II and the Cold War); Christopher Andrew,
Codebreaking and Signals Intelligence, 1 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 1, 1–2
(1986) (discussing the role of Signal Intelligence throughout the Cold War);
Michael Herman, Assessment Machinery: British and American Models, 10
INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 13 (1995) [hereinafter Herman, Assessment
Machinery] (discussing the intelligence estimate systems); Daniel B. Silver,
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 935, 965 (John
Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005) (discussing covert and overt
methods of intelligence gathering); SHULSKY, supra note 6, at 171–77 (outlining
espionage as knowledge, activity, and organization).
9. Cf. WALZER, supra note 3, at 51–62 (outlining the theory of aggression,
which provides that a nation may only use force against another nation under
imminent threat or actual harm).
10. See id. at 51 (equating war with aggression as it disrupts peace).
11. See SHULSKY, supra note 6, at 172 (asserting that definitions of
intelligence could differ depending on wartime and peacetime).
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current justifications for espionage, including the realist argument
and an application of JWT, and finds them inadequate. In Parts III
and IV, this article offers a new approach to justifying espionage.
First, it argues that states should be subject to a duty of basic
transparency in their relations with other states. Second, espionage
serves as a transparency-enforcing device, one that resolves an
otherwise irresolvable political conflict between liberal and nonliberal nations. In light of espionage’s sophisticated and essential role
in international relations, this article argues that a rule that permits
espionage as an instrument for enforcing a duty of basic transparency
among nations would be endorsed by all impartial, rational, and
reasonable nations.

II. THE INADEQUACY OF AVAILABLE
ARGUMENTS
A. THE REALIST ARGUMENT
This section reviews the position of international relations realism
on espionage.12 Broadly speaking, realists tend to prioritize national
interests over moral duties.13 This view rests on the notion that
human beings are egotistical and states operate in an anarchical
international sphere.14 In this sense, realists do not argue that
12. Before presenting the realist argument, an academic caveat is in order. It is
probably something of an over-generalization to treat realists as members of a
well-defined discipline. In fact, it is doubtful whether realism can be seen as a
discipline at all, let alone one with precise boundaries. This issue of overgeneralization notwithstanding, realists do seem to share certain common
denominators. Realism reflects a theoretical approach to international relations that
grants some degree of priority to national interests over morality. Scholarly
literature tends to split realism into “classical realism” and “modern realism” or
“neorealism,” and this article follows this conventional classification in my
discussion.
13. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Twentieth-Century Realism, in TRADITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 85 (Terry Nardin & David Mapel eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Donnelly, Twentieth-Century] (discussing the realist rejection of the application of
morals to state action); Steven Forde, Classical Realism, in TRADITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 62 (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992)
(explaining international realism’s belief in “primacy of self-interest over moral
principle”).
14. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS 1919-1939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10 (1946)
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espionage is morally justified but rather that states do not need to
morally justify it in the first place.15 To realists, adhering to moral
duties at the expense of national interests (represented, in this case,
by the need to spy) would not make sense. A state that eschews
espionage to comply with a moral duty puts its interests at risk, and
this, given the nature of the international sphere, could be fatal.
Moreover, one state’s compliance will have a marginal moral effect,
if any, because other actors on the international stage cannot be
expected to comply with the same moral duty and no central
enforcement authority exists in the international arena.
In the intelligence context, the realist argument seems
exceptionally powerful. Suppose that the international community
adopts a ban on espionage. From each state’s point of view, giving
up intelligence-gathering means practically accepting a kind of
national blindness. In fact, this blindness would extend to
information about other states’ non-compliance with the rule against
espionage because other states would presumably conduct their
espionage clandestinely. This is a crucial point because the stability
of any international norm hinges on each nation’s expectation that
the other nations will observe it.16 A powerful example of the realist
(describing realism as focus on causes, consequences, and the strength of existing
forces and character); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER
POLITICS (1946) [hereinafter MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN] (characterizing
politics as a struggle for power); REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL
SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS xi–xiii (2001) (finding collective
egoism based on moral agreement solidifies national cohesion and sets policy
within states); MICHAEL JOSEPH SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO
KISSINGER 2-3 (1986) (allowing that states under the realist perspective are more
concerned with self-interest than absolute moral truths). See generally HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE (2d ed. 1954) [hereinafter MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS];
Hans J. Morgenthau, Human Rights & Foreign Policy, CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON
RELIGION & INT’L AFF. https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/
1979_lecture_by_morgenthau/index.html/_res/id=sa_File1/HumanRights_Foreign
Policy_Morgenthau.pdf (last visited July 15, 2014) [hereinafter Morgenthau,
Human Rights & Foreign Policy] (defending the realist perspective against human
rights critics).
15. See Forde, supra note 13, at 62 (describing the essence of realism as
primacy of self-interest over moral principle).
16. Cf. JANNA THOMPSON, JUSTICE AND WORLD ORDER: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY 31 (1992) (explaining Hobbes’ Laws of Nature theory, which describes
societal understanding that peaceful actions result in peaceful neighborhood);
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position on espionage is the United States’ self-imposed decision to
terminate its collection of Signal Intelligence (“SIGINT”) in 1929
because of a perceived moral duty not to intrude upon other peoples’
communications.17 This decision significantly harmed the United
States during World War II and the world has not improved because
of it in any way.18 No other state followed in the footsteps of the
United States.19 However, as powerful as the realist argument may
seem with respect to espionage, this article maintains that it is
fundamentally wrong.
The realist approach as a whole has been roundly criticized. Both
its empirical assumptions and its normative conclusions have elicited
convincing counter-arguments.20 This article does not take on the
realist argument in general. However, one general observation about
realism’s normative attitude that may have intelligence-related
implications is that difficult dilemmas of security and justice do not
justify a suspension of ethics. To the contrary, ethics is all about
these dilemmas: ethics is a normative instrument for guiding
Forde, supra note 13, at 77 (allowing Spinoza’s societal compacts to explain peace
through treaties under realists theory in the international context).
17. As Secretary of State, Henry Stimson closed the Department of State’s
code-breaking office, known as the “Black Chamber,” as described on the NSA’s
official website: “In his history of the Cipher Bureau, Yardley charged that
Stimson had axed the organization strictly for moralistic reasons. In his own
autobiography, Stimson did not deny this: he noted that although he became a
heavy consumer of decrypt intelligence in wartime, certain practices that might be
necessary during war were unacceptable during peace.” Pearl Harbor Review The Black Chamber, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/about/
cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/pearl_harbor_review/black_chamber.sht
ml (last visited May 25, 2014). See also HENRY L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY,
ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 188 (1947) (stating that the U.S. State
Department policy in 1931 was to give trust to gain trust); Louis Kruh, Stimson, the
Black Chamber, and the “Gentlemen’s Mail” Quote, 12 CRYPTOLOGIA 65, 69
(1988) (detailing the belief of U.S. diplomats that there would be lasting peace and
thus trust should be extended to other nations).
18. Cf. Herman, Assessment Machinery, supra note 8, at 25 (describing the
intelligence gap in 1939 as the United States attempted to understand the actions of
Adolf Hitler).
19. See Kruh, supra note 17, at 83 (finding that other nations almost certainly
did not follow the United States’ lead in abandoning cryptography).
20. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 3, at 7–20 (arguing that realism does not
account for the role morality plays in war and politics, even during national
security crises).
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decision-making in the face of difficult choices. The application of
ethical principles does not necessarily require rejecting national
interests because ethics weighs such interests and incorporates them
into how it treats moral dilemmas.21 This is why certain ethical
approaches permit violence and war in self-defense.22 Dilemmas
posed by espionage can similarly be governed by ethics.

B. THE ARGUMENT OF ‘JUST INTELLIGENCE’
The prominent justification for espionage is the “Just Intelligence”
argument, which rests on the state’s right of self-defense and on
JWT. The argument has two distinct forms. In its first form, it asserts
that intelligence is analogous to the use of force and is therefore
justified under the same conditions.23 The other form casts
intelligence as an inherent element of the use of force, as its natural
extension.24 Whether directly or by analogy, the Just Intelligence
approach argues that JWT should regulate espionage and serve as its
source of legitimacy: JWT should determine when an act of
espionage is justified, just as it determines when an act of war is
justified (“jus ad bellum”).25 Similarly, just as it assesses the legality
21. See Gendron, Just War, supra note 5, at 400 (providing that even in
moments of great adversity, democratic nations tend to maintain democratic
values, human rights, and civil liberties, even if flexibly).
22. See, e.g., Yitzhak Benbaji, A Defense of the Traditional War Convention,
118 ETHICS 464, 466–67 (2008) (outlining the self-defense argument for use of
force as a balancing of duties between attacker and victim).
23. See Gendron, Just War, supra note 5, at 402–03 (offering that the ethical
guide to regulating intelligence could be the same as the Just War moral criteria
used to regulate force); see also Michael Quinlan, Just Intelligence: Prolegomena
to an Ethical Theory, 22 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 1, 3–4 (2007) (drawing an
analogy of flexibility with intelligence gathering and use of force in extreme
circumstances, such as nuclear threat).
24. See John B. Chomeau & Anne C. Rudolph, Intelligence Collection and
Analysis: Dilemmas and Decisions, in ETHICS OF SPYING: A READER FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL 115 (Jan Goldman ed., 2006) (arguing that the
purpose and special expertise of intelligence officers is similar to that of military
officers); Arthur S. Hulnick & Daniel W. Mattausch, Ethics and Morality in
United States Secret Intelligence, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 515 (1989)
(equating intelligence gathering to a national security issue in which states are
obligated to protect citizens).
25. Cf. Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 34, 35 (2005) (providing conditions to allow for jus ad bellum as a
justified response to aggression, harboring individuals that have attacked the state,
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of military acts (“jus in bello”), JWT should decide which means are
legitimate for intelligence-gathering and which are not. This
seemingly attractive and powerful argument is fallacious. At best, it
justifies the collection of intelligence during wartime or other
emergencies; but peacetime espionage and wartime espionage are
fundamentally different. Wartime espionage is the easy case: when a
state faces a clear threat, a resort to espionage seems justified on its
face. In this situation, a simple, necessity-based justification seems
satisfactory. In contrast, spying in peacetime—namely, when State A
has no knowledge of a concrete and imminent threat against it by
State B—is an entirely different case. Accordingly, the following
paragraphs argue that the theoretical foundations of JWT are
inadequate for regulating peacetime espionage.
Generally speaking, JWT seeks to govern incidents in which an
emergency results from a state’s use of force. It aims first to prevent
such incidents. If they do occur, it attempts to minimize their
duration and resultant damage.26 A justification for peacetime
intelligence would contradict the basic rationale of this theory. As
peacetime espionage is a continuous activity, the Just Intelligence
argument is analogous to attempting to use JWT to justify an
indefinite use of force. Furthermore, JWT offers a clear method for
achieving its dual-phase goal. According to JWT, aggressors must be
deterred and even may be punished.27 However, a particular
aggressor can only be deterred and punished if the aggressor can be
identified. JWT facilitates identifying the aggressor by imposing a
baseline norm of non-violence.28 Against a backdrop of routine peace
and quiet, an illegitimate attack can be identified immediately, like
the first drop of ink falling on a sheet of white paper. Unlike
violence, peacetime intelligence is an ongoing operation. Identifying
the “aggressor” in everyday espionage would be like reading white
and perhaps humanitarian causes).
26. On the purposes of JWT, see Benbaji, supra note 22, at 494–95 (providing
universal ethical framework of soldiers within battlefields as legitimate targets in
war to prevent unnecessary destruction).
27. According to JWT, on the idea that the aggressor must be identified and
punished by way of disarmament, incapacitation, and deterrence, see Hurka, supra
note 25, at 41.
28. See id. at 38 (explaining that war should be resorted to only when the harm
it causes is outweighed by a positive outcome).
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letters on that same sheet of white paper. The “aggression” espionage
respond to is unobservable.29 As opposed to threats of physical
aggression, the threat during peacetime cannot be objectively
ascertained.30 If objective evidence of a tangible threat were
available, it would amount to a state of emergency or conflict by
definition. Furthermore, the “war” which espionage during
peacetime targets is a never-ending war, contrary to the notion under
JWT that every war or hostility must come to an end.31
The Just Intelligence argument is flawed because it demands the
use of espionage only in response to a “true threat”—a requirement
that parallels JWT’s “just cause” requirement.32 This demand
exposes the circularity of the Just Intelligence argument. Just
Intelligence justifies espionage only in response to existing threats;
however, detecting such threats often requires prior intelligence. 33
Arguably, states do not need intelligence to know where to direct
their collection efforts.34 The fact that one state poses a threat to
29. Cf. Gendron, Just War, supra note 5, at 398 (stating that most intelligence
comes from open sources, but “actionable intelligence” is obtained by covert
means through intelligence collections).
30. Cf. id. at 416.
31. See WALZER, supra note 3, at 110 (asserting that once the aims of a Just
War are met, the war must end).
32. Cf. Gendron, Just War, supra note 5, at 415 (describing the “just cause”
requirement, which includes tests of “last resort, right intention, proportional
means, probability of success, regard for human consequences, and
discrimination”).
33. For instance, the question of why Israel should spy on Syria is easier than
the question of why Italy should spy on Libya. Indeed, the discovery of the Libyan
nuclear compound, a few years ago, was quite unexpected: the Libyan nuclear
threat came out of nowhere. According to the Just Intelligence argument, Italy
could not legitimately have collected intelligence against Libya unless it was
responding to a clear threat. Yet, without espionage, the Western intelligence
community would have remained entirely unaware of the Libyan threat. See, e.g.,
Bush Official: Libya’s Nuclear Program a Surprise, CNN (Dec. 19, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/12/19/libya.nuclear/index.html
[hereinafter Libya’s Nuclear Program] (reporting that Libya’s nuclear program
was more advanced than expected).
34. Israel, for example, does not need intelligence to know that Syria
represents a potential threat. Similarly, the U.S. recognizes that it must gather
intelligence about the Islamic Republic of Iran. Neither Israel nor the U.S. needs to
use its intelligence agency to identify these threats. Once a threat is recognized,
however, its particulars—such as when, how, and where it might materialize—do
call for intelligence-gathering. If this proposition is true, the circularity argument
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another is a fact that lies naturally within the latter state’s pool of
knowledge; recognizing a threat exists, as opposed to knowing the
details and nature of the threat, requires no prior intelligence. Indeed,
some states do not need to collect intelligence to know that certain
adversaries represent threats to them. For instance, this would be the
case for a state whose neighbor declares its harmful intentions
publicly. However, these are unrepresentative, easy cases. By
definition, one state declaring its hostile intentions throws the nations
involved into a state of emergency or conflict. This type of situation
is therefore best governed by the rules of necessity. True peacetime
espionage, on the other hand, is not based on any previously
articulated threat. To the contrary, it is driven by the fear that a
seemingly unthreatening neighbor is a proverbial wolf in sheep’s
clothing.35 Espionage that does not rest on any concrete knowledge
of a threat posed by an adversary is therefore justified by referencing
some general understanding of the adversary’s nature. This point
highlights another fundamental instance in which JWT is unsuitable
for justifying peacetime espionage. JWT is blind to general
information about states, information that does not amount to
identifying a concrete threat. JWT therefore cannot serve to justify
decisions to undertake espionage against particular states because of
the nature of those states.36
JWT grants an equal right of self-defense to all states. Intuitively,
however, the right to spy on other states during peacetime should be
predicated on some discriminating principle. The alternative would
be to allow peacetime espionage by all states against all states.
Considering the magnitude of the moral harm, this approach seems
unreasonable. Clearly, when it comes to certain target states,
peacetime espionage appears unnecessary.37 But how are we to
loses much of its weight. However, as argued later, Just War Theory cannot offer
such distinction, which is necessary for dealing with the circularity problem.
35. See, e.g., Libya’s Nuclear Program, supra note 33 (reporting that Libya’s
nuclear ambitions were greater than the United States or British intelligence
sources had estimated).
36. A state’s “nature” means something like what Rawls defines as a state’s
comprehensive political or religious doctrine. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples,
CRITICAL INQUIRY 36, 37 (1993) [hereinafter Rawls, Peoples].
37. See, e.g., Katrin Bennhold, 2 U.S. Allies Diverge on Spy Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/europe/2-us-
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distinguish between states? If the right to spy against a given state
depends on preliminary intelligence, the justification for espionage is
circular: preliminary intelligence is the product of espionage and
cannot play a part in justifying it. On the other hand, if identifying
just targets for espionage relies on each state’s general nature which
is common knowledge and does not require prior intelligence, then
the justification for this enterprise cannot be JWT because JWT is
blind to states’ political and religious doctrines. From this, three
basic conclusions about peacetime espionage may be drawn: (1) a
persuasive justification for peacetime espionage will need to identify
some kind of link between the right to spy and the nature of a given
state; (2) the Just Intelligence argument cannot identify any such link
because it is morally blind to the nature of any particular state; (3) if
the Just Intelligence argument were to offer this kind of link, it
would ipso facto abandon its JWT underpinnings.
Though related, war and espionage are very different phenomena.
As far as peacetime espionage is concerned, the moral framework
that governs war seems quite inapposite.

III. THE IDEAL DUTY OF TRANSPARENCY
This section argues for a duty of basic transparency in
international relations. As would be the case for any moral argument
that concerns the international sphere, the starting point is a
schematic depiction of the international community. The label
“international community” communicates the key theme that
characterizes relations between states: states are clustered in a
communal structure. Community requires a modicum of cooperation,
which relies partly on trust.38 Community also refers to proximity.39
“Proximity” is defined as follows: State A and State B are proximate
if the offensive military technology of one would be effective against
allies-diverge-on-spy-program.html?_r=0 (giving an account of the possible
political fallout from U.S. spying on German and British citizens).
38. See generally ANDREW H. KYDD, TRUST AND MISTRUST IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 21 (2005) (stating that trust is a natural outcome
between democratic nations because they both seek security).
39. See generally ALAA A. H. ABD ALAZIZ, BALANCE OF THREAT PERCEPTION
AND THE PROSPECTS OF NATO MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE 17 (2003) (defining
attributes of threat from one nation to another, including geographic proximity and
capability).
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the other.40 By definition, the proximity of X to Y therefore means
that X possesses the capacity to harm Y. Considering the communal
structure of the international community, a given state’s concern that
a proximate state harbors harmful intentions seems inherently nontrivial. History reveals that proximate states are not only wellsituated to harm one another—in many cases, they also intend to do
so.41 Given that (1) most states possess some effective offensive
military capability; (2) some states are inclined to be aggressive; and
(3) the interests that are threatened by aggression are no less vital—it
follows that states are rationally and inherently risk-averse with
respect to aggression.42
The most dangerous type of aggression is the kind that erupts by
strategic surprise. History offers many examples of such surprise
attacks, including Nazi Germany’s Operation Barbarossa against
Russia,43 Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor,44 the coordinated attack
40. The definition of proximity is therefore a product of the specific
circumstances, including State A and State B’s geographical, military, economic,
and logistical attributes. See infra Part IV.H.
41. See, e.g., ABD ALAZIZ, supra note 39, at 34 (describing the agression
between Israel and its Arab neighbors).
42. The international community has accordingly adopted norms that
recognize aggression as a crime. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (prohibiting the threat
or the use of force in international relations); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 152–62 (2008) (describing the development of crime of aggression
in international law starting with the London Agreement of 1945); YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 106-114 (2001) (outlining the
history of criminalizing aggressive wars as crimes against peace). International law
further recognizes rules that control self-defense in response to aggression and
attempt to minimize the resultant damage. Additionally, since the international
community has no effective central government, each state must act independently
when immediate defensive measures are necessary. On the theoretical meaning of
the crime of aggression, see WALZER, supra note 3, at 51–62.
43. See BARTON WHALEY, CODEWORD BARBAROSSA 2–5 (1973) (presenting
the surprising nature of Hitler’s attack at Barbarossa as the source of Soviet
defeat); Hayden B. Peake, A Review of “David E. Murphy: What Stalin Knew: The
Enigma of Barbarossa”, 19 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 376,
377 (2006) (stating that the Soviet army had lost nearly several million men from
the fallout of the Barbarossa defeat); Amnon Sella, ‘Barbarossa’: Surprise Attack
and Communication, 13 J. CONTEMP. HIST.
555, 574–79 (1978) (detailing the attack as absolutely devastating for Soviet
ground and air forces).
44. See HERBERT FEIS, THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR: THE COMING OF THE
WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 333–41 (1950) (analyzing the lack
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by Egypt and Syria against Israel in 1973,45 and the 9/11 attacks on
America.46 What kind of advance information could foil the surprise
element that such strikes rely on?47 Any sudden attack is the product
of two key conditions: capabilities and intentions.48 Capabilities
encompass the military, economic, logistical, and political abilities to
launch an attack. History suggests that modern warfare requires the
complete devotion of all the national resources of a belligerent
state.49 Assessing the offensive capabilities of a proximate state must
therefore draw on a broad body of data about its situation across a
host of parameters.50 The second prerequisite for a sudden attack—
and the more important condition from the neighboring state’s point
of warning the United States had before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor).
45. See Avi Shlaim, Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of
the Yom Kippur War, 28 WORLD POL. 348, 348 (1976) (stating that the Israeli
government believed its border was secure enough to preclude any attack). But see,
EPHRAIM KAM, SURPRISE ATTACK: THE VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE 14–15 (1988)
(describing Israeli estimates in 1973 that neighboring Arab states would have long
range bomber capability by 1975 or 1976 and thus the capability to attack).
46. See DAVID RAY GRIFFIN, THE NEW PEARL HARBOR: DISTURBING
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND 9/11 xi (2004) (relating the
attacks on September 11, 2001 to the surprising nature of the Pearl Harbor attacks
of 1941). But see POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS, supra note 8, at 7–8
(reporting on the 9/11 Commission’s finding that both the Clinton and George W.
Bush administrations had some fault in not preventing the attack).
47. Since terrorist organizations, like regular states, are capable of
international aggression (i.e., threats against a nation’s political sovereignty or
territorial integrity), there is hardly any difference between the enterprises of
justifying espionage against these two types of targets. Since terrorist organizations
usually lack the governmental and communications infrastructures enjoyed by
states, the necessity of classic espionage—collecting intelligence from human
sources—is more acute where they are concerned. As a result, although this article
focuses on states, it considers terrorist organizations to be legitimate targets of
collection. However, while the article deals primarily with peacetime espionage,
counter-terrorism espionage is by nature a wartime activity. Broadly speaking, it
can be governed by the rules of necessity rather than by the rules of peacetimetransparency enforcement.
48. See KAM, supra note 45, at 22 (explaining the necessity of advance
strategic warning on enemy capabilities and intentions).
49. See generally Sella, supra note 43, 573 (providing detail on the level of
state coordination required to mount successful attacks).
50. Cf. HERMAN, INTELLIGENCE POWER, supra note 8, at 25–26 (“The First
World War had indeed shown that total war needed total intelligence; foreign
military power had come to depend on factors of industrial capacity, demography
and morale which fell outside the analysis of normal military and naval
intelligence.”).
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of view—is intentions, i.e., the will to take action to promote state
interests through the offensive use of force.51 Aggressive intentions
and military capabilities are thus essential elements of surprise
attacks. The victim’s surprise is primarily a matter of the following
features of the aggressor’s plans:

51. See KAM, supra note 45, at 22–23 (describing state intentions as one of the
more difficult aspects of intelligence analysts’ job).
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(1) whether the attack will actually happen, (2) its timing, (3) its location, and (4)
the way in which it will be carried out. If an attack is to take its victim by surprise,
it must find him wrong about at least one of these four questions, and usually
more. The basic question, of course, is whether an attack is expected at all. 52

The core element of strategic surprise is then whether the victim
expects an attack, rather than how it will unfold. The specifics of an
anticipated attack are secondary to the preliminary decision to launch
it. Applying the rules of necessity implies that once the victim is
aware that an aggressor intends to attack it, it has the right to spy on
the aggressor. The victim can then gather intelligence about the
tactical aspects of the attack, such as when, where, and how the
attack will materialize. Such efforts are permissible forms of
espionage and thus reflect only a marginal element of the effort to
justify espionage.53 Justifying peacetime espionage therefore remains
a challenge.
In an ideal world, no state would be aggressive. In a less ideal
world, in which aggression cannot be eliminated, the mistrust that
naturally results from each state’s awareness of history and
understanding of the nature of its neighboring states could easily be
resolved if all states’ strategic intentions could be determined in
advance. If states could verify that their neighbors’ intentions were
peaceful, they could avoid the unsustainable demands of continuous
vigilance and preparedness. Knowing its neighbors’ true intentions,
each state could maintain a moderate level of alertness and shift to a
higher level of alertness only when the state could no longer verify a
neighbor’s peaceful intentions. This state of higher alertness would
be limited in scope and time and would cease either when the
resulting conflict was over or when the peaceful intentions of the
neighbor were reconfirmed:

52. Id. at 12-13.
53. In some cases, the line between information about whether an attack will
occur and information about its timing and location may be blurred. This was true
of the 1973 attack on Israel. Israel understood that at some point in the future,
Egypt might use force to try to regain the Sinai desert. But this was a vague,
general expectation, which could have persisted for years. In this sense, the
surprise about the intention to attack merged with surprise about the attack’s exact
timing.
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Advanced warning is the vital link connecting intelligence assessment
with countermeasures designed to enhance readiness. Without adequate
advance warning military preparedness can never be sufficient to face the
threat. In this sense surprise can be regarded as the failure to issue an
advance warning to decision makers and troops that would enable them to
take appropriate precautions.54

The inability to confirm a neighbor’s peaceful intentions is
unsustainable. Unawareness of a neighbor’s intentions necessitates
continuous, paralyzing defensive readiness at the border and the use
of all available defense systems. Budget priorities must be
reevaluated. A larger share of the state’s total resources must be
allocated to military preparedness. Military reserves must be called
into service and wrenched from their vital role in the economy. Huge
amounts of oil, food, and other commodities must be stockpiled as
emergency reserves. The government and the public focus their
attention on the defensive effort and neglect other crucial needs. In
severe cases, a state’s rational risk aversion might lead it to engage in
a preventive, anticipatory attack. In some cases, states with limited
territorial depth might be unable to afford to rely on retaliatory
strikes. In other cases, a preventive strike might be the only way out
of the unsustainable state of blind preparedness. As this kind of
condition cannot last indefinitely, a rational state might elect to
assume the cost of a short war rather than suffer the consequences of
protracted vigilance.
Unless states are transparent about their strategic intentions to
some degree, fundamental international cooperation is impossible.
Neither security nor economic prosperity can be achieved in the face
of the continuous prospect of attack. Since World War I, military
technology has made armies faster, larger, more easily
maneuverable, and far more destructive. Missile warfare further
amplifies the effect of growing speed and destruction. A failure to
anticipate or cope with an oncoming attack could prove fatal. 55 A
state that is taken by surprise and attacked by a large, quick army
might awaken too late, only to find that its enemy has already gained
54. KAM, supra note 45, at 22.
55. Cf. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS, supra note 8, at 77-78
(explaining the consequences of the U.S.’s failure to anticipate a surprise Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor).
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a substantial military advantage. In some cases, the enemy might
conquer large portions of its territory. In more extreme cases, a
surprise attack might quickly threaten a state’s political sovereignty
and existence as an independent nation.56 As a result, states cannot
assume that they will not be attacked, but must make sure of it. The
international community cannot afford the paralyzing costs of
continuous preparedness on its members’ behalf. The solution to this
problem lies in information: states must be able to obtain enough
information about their proximate neighbors to free them from the
unsustainable demands of unceasing preparedness. To this end, states
must know their proximate neighbors’ strategic intentions.

A. ON CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
To avoid the unstable state of perpetual preparedness, this section
argues that states’ need for information would be met if the strategic
intentions of their proximate neighbors were transparent. As already
mentioned, aggression requires both military offensive capabilities
and simultaneous aggressive intentions.57 Intentions are the most
important element of a surprise attack, as most states possess attack
capabilities at any given time. A concrete risk of attack only
materializes when a state’s aggressive intentions combine with their
capabilities. Therefore, information about strategic intentions could
potentially free nations from the unsustainable condition of blind
alert.58
56. Three modern examples illustrate this risk: Kuwait in 1990, France in
WWII, and some of the Golan Heights in 1973. All three areas were conquered
very quickly and in a manner that has only become possible in modern warfare.
57. In theory, a state could reduce the risk of surprise aggression by obtaining
advance information about either the neighbor’s intentions or its capabilities, or
both. These varieties of information are typically categorized as “intelligence on
intentions” and “intelligence on capabilities.” David Kahn, An Historical Theory of
Intelligence, 16 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC . 79, 81–82 (2001). See also KAM,
supra note 45, at 22–23 (discussing the importance and difficulty of gathering
intelligence on enemy intentions).
58. Naturally, capabilities do not create the risk of aggression unless a state
also intends to aggressively use these capabilities. It is true, though, that
information about capabilities can sometimes shed light on intentions. For
instance, suppose that information gathered by State A suggests that its neighbor,
State B, has procured new strategic weapon systems and has conducted intensive
training in an apparently offensive pattern. This information alone may not
conclusively show that State B has adopted offensive intentions, but it can support
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It is important to distinguish between information about strategic
intentions and information about tactical intentions. The former
addresses the kind of question that goes to the heart of a state’s level
of alert, i.e., whether the proximate neighbor is planning an act of
aggression. In contrast, the latter addresses how the proximate
neighbor will specifically execute their strategic intention, such as
when, where, and how the state might carry out an attack.59 These are
secondary questions. They may affect how a state implements a state
of alert and preparedness but do not shape the answer to the state’s
primary strategic question—whether it should be on high alert in the
first place. Information about the proximate neighbor’s strategic
intentions answers this question.
Information about strategic intentions is far more valuable than
information about capabilities because the military capabilities of
states are not very well-kept secrets in practice. Squadrons,
battleships, and armored divisions cannot be easily concealed.
Private intelligence agencies offer extremely accurate and detailed
information about the military capabilities of every country on the
planet.60 The uncertainty about a given state’s military capabilities is
relatively marginal. By contrast, the non-transparency of intentions
throws neighboring states into unsustainable alertness and preventive
use of force. Additionally, information about the military capabilities
of a neighboring state generally cannot allay security concerns. 61
Most military systems, like combat airplanes and warships, serve
both defensive and offensive purposes.62 Their existence does not
necessarily point to offensive intentions. Knowing about military
capabilities may be of tactical importance if an armed conflict erupts,
but it contributes little, if anything, to the more dramatic question of
whether sudden aggression is on the horizon.63 Only answering this
such a hypothesis.
59. HERMAN, INTELLIGENCE POWER, supra note 8, at 123.
60. See, e.g., Jane’s Security Intelligence Solutions, IHS, http://www.ihs.com/
products/janes/security/index.aspx (last visited June 1, 2014) (providing an
example of offerings of private intelligence agency).
61. Cf. HERMAN, INTELLIGENCE POWER, supra note 8, at 25 (explaining that
pre-World War II, Britain’s information about German military capabilities and
military build-up did not allay security concerns).
62. Id. at 176.
63. The example of Israel’s attempt to assess Egyptian intentions in 1973 also
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question can allow states to have reasonable readiness costs and
allow for basic international security and cooperation.64
In summary, no state can tolerate being blind to the strategic
intentions of its proximate neighbors for a prolonged period of time.
A state of high alert driven by rational risk aversion can likely
disturb states’ basic security and stand in the way of international
economic cooperation. The availability of information can easily
resolve this unsustainable situation. If states know the strategic
intentions of their neighbors in advance, they can avoid the
devastating costs of vigilance and the international community can
demonstrates the hazards of linking information about capabilities to information
about intentions. Israel’s effort to deduce Egypt’s intentions from its military
capabilities proved completely misguided. Israeli intelligence erroneously posited
that Egypt’s possession of advanced anti-aircraft systems would indicate an
intention to launch an attack on Israel. Eventually, Egypt decided to attack despite
lacking these systems. Information about strategic intentions is therefore superior,
as far as preparedness for surprise attacks, to information about military
capabilities. In many cases, information about military capabilities cannot and
should not serve as a sufficient indication of strategic intentions. See generally URI
BAR-JOSEPH, THE WATCHMEN FELL ASLEEP: T HE SURPRISE OF YOM KIPPUR AND
ITS SOURCES (2005) [hereinafter BAR-JOSEPH, T HE WATCHMEN]; Uri Bar-Joseph,
Israel’s 1973 Intelligence Failure, 6 ISR. AFF. 11 (1999) [hereinafter Bar-Joseph,
Israel’s 1973 Intelligence] (describing the failure of Israeli intelligence to warn
about the threat of an Egyptian attack).
64. The case of nuclear weapons shows that even a state that knows that its
neighbor possesses the ultimate weapon does not, in itself, mean that it can
automatically anticipate an upcoming war. However, when nuclear capabilities
combine with a regime’s lack of transparency, its neighbors tend to react far more
seriously. The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on this matter implies that the possession of
nuclear weapons per se should not be interpreted as an intention to use them. At
least nine states are presumed to possess some level of nuclear military
capabilities. Yet, this information has not led neighboring states to conclude that
attack is imminent. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8). See generally Louise Doswald-Beck,
International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court
of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, INT’L REV. RED
CROSS, Feb. 28, 1997, at 35 (analyzing the contribution of the ICJ’s Advisory
Opinion to the interpretation of international humanitarian law); Richard Falk, The
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New Jurisprudence of Global Civil
Society, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 333 (1997) (considering the effect of
international law on the behavior of democratic nations); Dale Stephens, Human
Rights and Armed Conflict: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice in the NuclearWeapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2001)
(discussing the ICJ’s analysis of the interrelation of the law of armed conflict and
international human rights law).
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maintain a measure of security and trust. Therefore, a duty of basic
transparency about strategic intentions should be recognized in
relations between proximate states. A “transparent state” would
make its strategic decisions, such as the decision to go to war,
reasonably identifiable to its proximate neighbors. In other words, a
state is transparent if it adopts strategic intentions in a way that
cannot surprise its neighbors.
At first glance, a duty of transparency likely seems troubling. The
duty of transparency seems to require states to disclose their strategic
intentions. It also seems irrational to expect a state to disclose its
delinquent intentions, such as a plan to go to war, just like it would
be irrational to demand a criminal to be transparent about his or her
intentions to commit a crime. Similarly, it seems equally irrational to
require states to disclose peaceful intentions. This information would
seem unnecessary. More importantly, it makes very little sense to
rely on disclosed information of a state’s peaceful intentions because
states cannot verify the reliability of this information. As a result,
this kind of information cannot really contribute to alleviating the
unsustainable state of preparedness that results from nontransparency. Therefore, a requirement of transparency seems
irrational with regards to both harmful and peaceful intentions. Has
the quest to untangle the insufferable situation of non-transparency
reached a dead end? I believe not. The requirement of basic
transparency is not a matter of disclosing certain information and
does not require disclosing peaceful or harmful strategic intentions.
Instead, it demands that states maintain a transparent structure.
What must be transparent is not what a state intends to do but rather
the process through which it adopts these intentions. Instead of
demanding that state leaders come out of the deliberation room and
disclose the results of their deliberations, the requirement of
transparency asks that the deliberation room be made of glass.
The next section explains why the transparency requirement is a
structural requirement. A properly transparent structure calls for
institutions that are typical of liberal democracies, such as free
elections, parliamentary oversight, and a free press. This point
illuminates what a transparent neighbor entails: a state with a
transparent neighbor knows at least as much about the strategic
intentions of its neighbor as a citizen in a typical liberal democracy
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knows about the intentions of his or her own country.65 The structural
nature of transparency suggests that the duty of basic transparency is
rational after all. However, the fact that transparency is structurally
characteristic of liberal states leads into another problem: the
problem of liberal political imperialism.

B. TRANSPARENCY AND LIBERAL POLITICAL IMPERIALISM
As an example, let us posit that State A has no intention of
attacking its neighbor, State B. State A is aware of the potential
consequences of its own non-transparency. It may suffer
economically without a basic relationship of trust with State B. It
may be mistakenly attacked by State B because State B
misinterpreted its intentions under conditions of uncertainty and risk
aversion.66 Under these circumstances, it seems trivial for State A to
communicate its true intentions to State B. It must send a clear
message to State B: “We are not going to attack you.” Unfortunately,
this sort of message would not suffice to alleviate the tension
between the states. In this context, transparency hinges on the
specific structure of a state and is not the result of a specific message.
State B cannot simply rely on State A’s message because State A
could theoretically declare Φ and, in practice, doΦ (the opposite of
Φ). In fact, this is exactly what State B might expect State A to do as
part of a strategic deception plan. State B will only be able to trust
State A’s intentions if State A adopts these intentions in a process
that is transparent to State B. If such a process were in place, there
would be no sense in saying Φ and meaningΦ. Since the structure
of State A’s deliberation process would be transparent, the
intentionΦ would come through notwithstanding any declarations to
the contrary. This kind of continuous transparency requires a
particular type of political structure—the type of structure that
surrounds the state’s deliberative process with glass walls.
65 See BRUCE M. RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES
FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD 38-39 (1995) (stating that democracies do not fear
surprise attacks from other democracies).
66. On wars resulting from the misinterpretation of the adversary’s intentions,
see generally BRUCE B UENO DE M ESQUITA & DAVID LALMAN, WAR AND REASON:
DOMESTIC AND I NTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVES 39-40 (1992); BRUCE M. RUSSETT,
supra note 65, at 39–40; David A. Lake, Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and
War, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 24 (1992).
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If a state’s basic transparency is a product of a specific kind of
structure, then it is important to distinguish between typical liberal
democracies and non-liberal regimes. One of the most salient
indicators of a democratic regime is its deliberation process.67 Free
elections, parliamentary oversight, basic human rights, and a free
press all contribute to the transparency of the deliberative process.
The people elect the leaders of both the executive and legislative
branches only after a protracted and typically tedious campaign in
which the public learns about the candidates.68 In liberal
democracies, electoral campaigns illuminate the candidates’
opinions, expose their personal lives, reveal their characters, and
identify their circles of influence. Even after the elections, the pursuit
of transparency continues. Leaders know that the public must favor
their decisions or they will be punished in the next elections.69
Governments are subject to parliamentary oversight and must openly
discuss the policies by which they will be judged. In many cases,
leaders cannot adopt weighty strategic objectives, such as going to
war, without parliamentary support in the form of approving the use
of armed forces and providing for special budgetary appropriations.70
67. See Erik O. Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, Europe in Transformation:
How to Reconstitute Democracy? 6-7 (May 17-19, 2007) (unpublished European
Union Studies Association conference paper), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/
7876/1/fossum%2Dj%2D10d.pdf (underlining the importance of public
justification in a legitimate democracy).
68. Cf. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS
AND PERFORMANCE IN T HIRTY-SIX C OUNTRIES 128 (1999) (commenting on the
strength democratically elected presidents draw from popular election).
69. On the influence of the accountability of democratic leaders on the
international conduct of democratic states, see JOHN M. OWEN IV, LIBERAL PEACE,
LIBERAL WAR: AMERICAN P OLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (2000)
(commenting that democratic leaders are unlikely to pursue “unpopular war[s]” due to
the risk of losing future elections”); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., An Institutional
Explanation of the Democratic Peace, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 791 (1999) (explaining
that democratic leaders are unlikely to wage war because waging war requires broad
support); Lake, supra note 66, at 24 (asserting that democracies wage war less
often and more successfully because they do so only with majority support);
RUSSETT, supra note 65, at 39–40 (arguing that leaders of democracies are
generally reluctant to go to war with other democracies because of institutional
constraints and will likely settle the conflict short of war).
70. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991)
(explaining that Congress is more likely to support going to war but not declaring
war); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War,
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The media also serves as an important arena of policy deliberations
and scrutiny. In a democratic state, the press enjoys freedom of
speech and liberty of movement, which plays an important role in
monitoring the reliability of the state’s assertions.71 In a free market,
the press has a powerful incentive to uncover contradictions between
the government’s professed intentions and its actual plans.72
In light of the inherent nature of transparent deliberation, many
would consider typical democratic regimes to be transparent about
their strategic intentions. The transparent structure that characterizes
democratic nations makes it nearly impossible for them to launch a
surprise attack.73 A surprise attack would require the democratic
government to secretly adopt an offensive plan, to refrain from
priming public opinion on the matter, to circumvent parliamentary
authorization and budgetary oversight, and to conduct massive
military preparations in secret under the free press’s nose.74
Regardless of the fact that rational leaders of democratic states are
unlikely to seek this path, they would be unable to do so in practice. 75
82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997) (suggesting that the Founding Fathers intended
Congress alone to have the power to declare war); William W. Van Alstyne,
Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1972) (discussing the constitutional limits on the President’s ability
to declare war without Congress’s approval).
71. Cf. Eriksen, supra 67, at 6 (describing the necessity of accountability
through communication with the public to successful democracies).
72. Cf. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Democratic States and Commitment in
International Relations, 50 I NT’L ORG. 109, 121–22 (1996) (discussing different
perspectives on the relationship between the domestic institutions of liberal
democracies, the effect of these institutions on international transparency, and
states’ international conduct). On the structural transparency of liberal states, see
James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577 (1994) (arguing that democracies are more able
to clearly signal their intentions because of their strong domestic audiences);
Kenneth A. Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 829 (1998) (explaining that multi–party democracies have a
more open political system).
73. See Eriksen, supra note 67, at 6. (asserting the importance of
accountability in a democracy whereby decision-makers are responsible to and
controlled by citizens).
74. See RUSSETT, supra note 65, at 38-39 (noting that democracies are not
capable of surprise attacks, while nondemocratic states are).
75. See, e.g., Gaubatz, supra note 72, at 113 (noting that democratic societies
are less likely to make calculated decisions on those based on emotion or public
opinion). Cf. RUSSETT, supra note 65, at 38 (commenting that democratic leaders
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By definition, domestic transparency implies transparency in
international relations.76 The liberal democracy’s governing
institutions have no way of communicating a selective message that
would reach only the country’s citizens but keep foreign listeners in
the dark.77 Therefore, domestic structural transparency incidentally
and substantially contributes to maintaining stable relations with
neighboring states.78
Liberal democracies are, however, transparent only about their
strategic intentions, not necessarily about any other type of
information, such as tactical intentions. For example, the U.S.
military might have managed tactically to surprise Saddam Hussein
as far as the manner in which it began its war against his regime,
including the exact times and places of its strikes. However, in both
recent Gulf Wars, the U.S. did not even attempt to strategically
surprise Saddam with respect to its intention to use force.79 Thus far,
the analysis suggests that not all circumstances of peacetime
espionage are justifiable. Espionage against prototypical liberal
democracies that purports to uncover their strategic intentions seems
both unnecessary and unjustifiable because these intentions are
public and do not call for clandestine intelligence-gathering.
This article does not intend to equate the liberal political structure
with transparency. Indeed, it does not attempt to define the liberal
political structure. However, it posits that a typical liberal structure is
strongly correlated with transparency. In other words, liberal
democracies are not by definition sufficiently transparent, but they
are typically and habitually transparent. It allows delegates to
are even less likely to attack other democracies because they recognize their
inability to carry out a surprise attack due to societal constraints).
76. See RUSSETT, supra note 65, at 40 (noting that leaders of democracies expect
time for international conflict prevention mechanisms to take place and thus do not
fear surprise attacks by other democracies).
77. See Gaubatz, supra note 72, at 122–23 (explaining that democratic
assertions of international intentions have more credibility when there is a
domestic effect as well).
78. See id. at 122 (discussing the interrelation between democratic domestic
and international commitments).
79. The U.S. obviously knew in advance that a strategic surprise against Iraq
was not a prerequisite to achieving victory. This article argues, however, that
America could not have surprised Iraq strategically even had its leaders preferred
to do so.
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reasonably assume that a liberal nation is most likely a structurally
transparent nation.
I should also distinguish between democratic transparency and the
well-known idea of “democratic peace.” The “democratic peace”
thesis stems from the empirical proposition that democracies do not
tend to wage wars against each other.80 This thesis deduces that
democracies are less aggressive toward one another and thus less
likely to attack.81 The democratic peace thesis is not without
controversy.82 Regardless of its controversial nature, this article’s
argument is entirely independent.83 This article argues that
democratic states are less likely to wage surprise attacks against their
adversaries.84 The reasoning is simple: the typical democratic
structure forces states to transparently adopt strategic intentions.

80. Paul R. Hensel et al., The Democratic Peace and Rivalries, 62 J. POL. 1173
(2000).
81. See, e.g., id.; Dean V. Babst, Elective Governments―A Force For Peace, 3
WISC. SOCIOLOGIST 9 (1964); Nils Petter Gleditsch, Democracy and Peace, 29 J.
PEACE RES. 369 (1992); CARR, supra note 14; M ORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC M AN,
supra note 14, at 188.
82. Following others, this article supports the idea of democratic peace and
does not share Rawls’s assumption that the idea of democratic peace is
uncontroversial. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC
REASON REVISITED” 44–53 (2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES]. On the
controversy over democratic peace, see generally Melvin Small & J. David Singer,
The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965, 1 JERUSALEM J. INT’L
REL. 50 (1976).
83. This article’s argument and the notion of Democratic Peace may be
indirectly related. A state’s democratic character seems linked to a weaker
inclination toward aggression. This weaker inclination, however, is not required
for the article’s argument to be valid.
84. On the idea that the structural transparency of democratic states prevents
them from being able to attack their adversaries by surprise, see RUSSETT, supra
note 65, at 38–40. This idea has been challenged by Sebastian Rosato. See
Sebastian Rosato, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, 97 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 585, 597–98 (2003) (asserting that democracies are equally capable of
carrying out surprise attacks, since the success of the attack does not depend on the
type of regime). However, this article strongly disagrees with Rosato’s approach.
Of ten notable surprise attacks that have occurred in the post-World War Two era,
Rosato zeroes in on only two. He concludes that the apparent surprise attacks by
Israel against Egypt in both 1956 (in a joint operation with Britain and France) and
1967 clearly contradict the proposition that democracies cannot launch surprise
attacks. Rosato appears to err on the historical facts, and he may also conflate
strategic surprise and tactical surprise.
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Therefore, a typical democracy can surprise neither its citizens nor
its adversaries as far as decisions like going to war.85 Yet, the
account of the liberal process of transparent deliberation draws more
attention to the conduct of non-transparent states and their potential
to surprise their adversaries and hide their true intentions, including
potential belligerence.
In contrast, non-democratic regimes are not subject to a
transparent process of deliberation. Such regimes typically deliberate
about strategic matters, such as instigating war, in very restricted
forums. This was the case for Iraq under Saddam Hussein and for
North Korea under Kim Jong-Il, each of which featured no
deliberative process other than the one inside its leader’s head.86
Opposition in non-democratic regimes is practically nonexistent, and
the media is typically an instrument of propaganda rather than a
reflection of genuine public debate.87 The forgoing portrait describes
extreme examples of non-democratic polities. Most non-democratic
nations fall somewhere on the spectrum between this extreme and a
more transparency-oriented political structure. All, however, fall well
short of the kind of transparency characteristic of the liberal
democracy as it is commonly conceived. Even though a given state’s
transparency is a matter of degree, its neighbors will eventually tend
to reach a dichotomic conclusion: either that the state’s strategic
intentions are transparent or that they are not.88 This tendency to
85. This does not mean, however, that democratic states cannot surprise their
adversaries on the tactical level by, for example, attacking at a tactically surprising
instant or employing a surprising method of attack. Ruses of war are both
permissible and practically available to democratic states. However, the very resort
to military force by a democratic regime is likely to surprise neither its citizens nor
its adversaries. In other words, democracies are unlikely to initiate strategic
surprise attacks.
86. See generally JASPER BECKER, ROGUE REGIME: K IM JONG IL AND THE
LOOMING T HREAT OF NORTH KOREA 148-52 (2005); EFRAIM KARSH & I NARI
RAUTSI, SADDAM HUSSEIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 220-21 (1991).
87. Cf. Gaubatz, supra note 72, at 122 (describing the difficulty of knowing
the domestic or international intentions of closed societies controlled by a small
leadership).
88. This article does not attempt to contribute to the ongoing legal and
political scientific debates about the precise definition of democracy. For all
practical purposes, democracy—its precise definition notwithstanding—typically
implies a basic transparency of strategic intentions. This thesis does not rule out
the theoretical (and remote) possibility that a state that is widely recognized as a
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classify states depending on whether they meet (or fail to meet) a
certain transparency threshold underpins the fundamentally
dichotomic approach that this article takes toward transparency even
though, strictly speaking, transparency is a gradable characteristic.
Since transparency calls for a specific political-institutional structure,
the question of whether or not a certain state is sufficiently
transparent can be reduced to the question of whether or not a state
has a transparent political structure. Because a transparent political
structure typically consists of free elections, government
accountability, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press, the
question of whether a state is transparent overlaps to a great extent
with (but not entirely) with the question of whether it is a typical
liberal democracy.89 Again, this article does not argue that
democracy and transparency correspond completely, but that there is
strong correlation between the two.
So far, this article asserts that the international communal structure
entails proximity and necessitates a basic degree of cooperation
between states. This structure calls for a duty of basic transparency
of strategic intentions. Transparency is a structural quality that is
characteristic of liberal states. These propositions point to an
irresolvable political conflict that impairs international cooperation.
On the one hand, liberal nations cannot maintain reasonably
cooperative relations with their non-liberal, non-transparent
neighbors. On the other hand, non-liberal nations cannot adopt the
kind of structure that is a prerequisite for the degree of transparency
that minimal cooperation requires: this kind of structure would
presumably contradict their political or religious doctrines; it would
force them to adopt elements characteristic of a liberal political
structure. As discussed below, espionage offers a practical solution
to this otherwise irresolvable political crisis.

IV. ESPIONAGE AS A SOLUTION TO THE
democracy may be found to be insufficiently transparent. Similarly, this article
does not reject the remote possibility that a non-liberal nation might happen to be
fundamentally transparent.
89. This does not mean that there can be no controversy over whether a certain
state is a liberal democracy or not. This controversy, however, will tend to define
the state dichotomously (as one or the other).
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LIBERAL CRISIS
Espionage serves as a non-structural substitute for an international
duty of basic transparency. Espionage generates non-voluntary
enforcement of a duty of transparency without imposing a liberal
structure on non-liberal states. This portrait of espionage does not
attempt to redefine it but rather attempts to offer a different
perspective on its role and significance. This representation of
espionage, however, is also not strictly descriptive. By casting
espionage in this light, this argument indirectly touches on the issue
of its legitimacy. This depiction of espionage underpins the
justification for it: all well-ordered states, including non-liberal
states, would hypothetically endorse a duty of basic transparency if it
were enforced only by means of espionage.
In light of the conflict between the need for basic transparency and
the unattractiveness of liberal political imperialism, this section
proposes a new approach to the role of international espionage.
Espionage serves as an instrument that allows liberal and non-liberal
nations to achieve a basic degree of cooperation. It facilitates a
practical solution to the otherwise irresolvable crisis of cooperation
between liberal and non-liberal nations. It bridges the gap between
unsustainable non-transparency for liberal states and an unacceptable
liberalism-style duty of transparency for non-liberal states.
Espionage that effectively clarifies the strategic intentions of nonliberal target nations creates the effective equivalent of transparent
target nations. It offers the non-liberal target state an alternative to
being transparent toward its proximate neighbors. It, however,
facilitates transparency in a very restrained manner. It does not foist
an unacceptable political structure upon non-liberal nations. It also
spares target nations from other more damaging forms of external
interference, like war or political intervention.
Based on this depiction of espionage, espionage is a legitimate,
justifiable endeavor as an instrument for enforcing transparency in
international relations. This argument takes a contractarian approach
to international justice. A duty of basic international transparency,
enforced exclusively through espionage, is legitimate because the
hypothetical representatives of all well-ordered nations would
endorse it if they were placed in a hypothetical state of fairness and
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impartiality. The following section will present a contractarian
concept of global justice. It begins by outlining the background of
what is likely the most serious and thorough contractarian account of
global justice: John Rawls’s Law of Peoples (“LOP”).90 Next, it
offers objections to the structure of Rawls’s international original
position and to some of his presumptions. Then, it develops an
account of the deliberative process that would take place in the
international original position. This exercise constitutes the heart of
the argument for the legitimacy of international espionage.

A. A CONCEPT OF GLOBAL JUSTICE
This section situates the contractarian approach within the more
general context of related theories of international relations and
global justice. Liberalism faces a fundamental dilemma in the
international sphere, one that is quite relevant to the issue of
espionage’s legitimacy. Endeavoring to apply liberalism’s
democratic constitutional format to the international arena often
leads to a dead end.91 On the one hand, imposing liberalism on nonliberal peoples would breach a fundamental tenet of liberalism by
failing to tolerate differences in political and religious doctrines.92 On
the other hand, accepting non-liberal regimes as legitimate members
of the international community might result in overlooking violations
of human rights, which are equally fundamental to liberalism.93
Evidently, no escape route is available. A liberal conception of

90. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 82.
91. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 230 (2005) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
92. Cf. id. at 135 (explaining political liberalism’s assumption that “there are
many conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrictes”); RAWLS, LAW OF
PEOPLES, supra note 82, at 59–61 (explaining human rights as distinct from
constitutional rights that pertain to democracies or other kinds of political
institutions).
93. See Kok–Chor Tan, The Problem of Decent Peoples, in RAWLS’S LAW OF
PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 76, 81–84 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Tan, The Problem] (discussing Rawls’s concept that for states to
tolerate liberal states, they must also recognize non-liberal states as equal participants
in the international community); Leif Wenar, Why Rawls Is Not a Cosmopolitan
Egalitarian, in RAWLS’S LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 95-97 (Rex
Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 2006) (discussing Rawls’s theory that global justice
should share similar characteristics to domestic justice systems).
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global justice is either over-imperialistic or over-tolerant. Each path
seems extremely costly.
In some conceptions of global justice, the cost of over-imperialism
seems like a natural one to pay. Cosmopolitanism chooses human
rights over tolerance.94 It views the citizen as the primary moral
agent in the international sphere.95 Human rights and equality must
be protected, and states, if they have any role at all, should serve this
goal, not be served at its expense.96 On the broad spectrum of
94. The term “cosmopolitanism” reflects a high—perhaps excessively high—
level of generalization. The range of opinions and theories considered to be
cosmopolitan is broad and diverse. However, the mainstream political and moral
cosmopolitan approach sees citizens, rather than states, as the primary moral
agents in the international sphere. Traditionally, cosmopolitans support some
degree of national sovereignty, although a thinner sovereignty than that favored by
realists. The notion that cosmopolitans necessarily advocate for establishing one
unified world state or necessarily rejecting loyalty to one’s own nation state is a
common misconception. For prominent scholarship on cosmopolitanism, see
generally Charles R. Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J.
PHIL. 591 (1983) [hereinafter Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals]; Jürgen Habermas, Kant’s
Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight, in
PERPETUAL PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL 113 (James Bohman
& Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds., 1997); M ARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIER OF
J USTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES M EMBERSHIP (2007); ONORA
O’NEILL, BOUNDS OF J USTICE (2000); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND
ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF J USTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL T HOUGHT
(2001); PETER SINGER, ONE W ORLD: T HE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2002); KOKCHOR TAN, J USTICE WITHOUT BORDERS : COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND
PATRIOTISM (2004) [hereinafter TAN, J USTICE WITHOUT BORDER ]; Thomas W.
Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48 (1992) [hereinafter
Pogge, Cosmopolitanism].
95. See, e.g., Charles R. Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICS 669, 672
(2000) [hereinafter Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples]; Allen Buchanan, Rawls’s Law of
Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World, 110 ETHICS 697, 698 (2000)
[hereinafter Buchanan, Rawls’s Law of Peoples] (describing the necessity of
focusing on the rights of the individual in the international world); Thomas W.
Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & P UB. AFF. 195, 211 (1994)
[hereinafter Pogge, An Egalitarian Law] (explaining that concern for nations is concern
for individuals); Thomas W. Pogge, The Incoherence Between Rawls’s Theories of
Justice, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2003) [hereinafter Pogge, The
Incoherence] (arguing for the importance of considering the individual at both the
domestic and the international level).
96. To relativists, at the other end of the theoretical spectrum, tolerance is
naturally before an international menu of human rights. See, e.g., Catherine
Audard, Cultural Imperialism and “Democratic Peace”, in RAWLS’S LAW OF
PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 59, 59–60 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds.,
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possible approaches toward international relations, Rawls’s early
work seemed to suggest that his should be positioned near the
cosmopolitan end.97 However, the subsequent shift from A Theory of
Justice (“TOJ”) to LOP repositioned his approach away from both
the cosmopolitan and realist extremes.98
The most dramatic shift in LOP is that Rawls contends that
peoples, not citizens, are the primary moral agents and actors in the
international arena.99 Rawls views the international community as a
community of collectives.100 Like Michael Walzer’s legalist
paradigm, which underlies modern JWT, Rawls’s portrait of the
international realm directly affects the normative content of his

2006) (criticizing Rawls’s assertion that peace and democracy go hand-in-hand);
Barry Hindess, Neoliberal Citizenship, 6 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 127, 130 (2002)
(explaining that states are expected to take care of their own citizens before those of
others).
97. See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF J USTICE 184-85, 187 (1991);
CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 8–10 (1999)
[hereinafter BEITZ, P OLITICAL T HEORY]; THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 1–12
(1989) [hereinafter POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS] (outlining and providing
background to two of Rawls’s theories).
98. By constructing his theory of global justice as a realist utopia, Rawls
managed to satisfy neither one of the two factions. Rawls’s realism lies in his
choice to ground his theory in human nature and the world as they are at the time;
he does not count on any changes to the current nature of humans or peoples.
However, given these realist constraints, Rawls seeks to propose the best order and
basic structure that could be desired. This is the utopian element of his approach.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF J USTICE 3-19 (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY
OF JUSTICE].
99. Rawls refers to peoples rather than states mainly because he views
peoples, not states, as not necessarily worthy of sovereignty. For the sake of clarity
and simplicity, the terms “states” and “peoples” are used interchangeably. RAWLS,
LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 82, at 23–30.
100. This view accords with Rawls’s position that the international realm could
not sustainably be consolidated into a single global state. This structural
cosmopolitan idea could have eliminated the gap between the liberal domestic
conception of justice—as represented by the constitutional democratic regime—
and the conception of justice presented in LOP. Rawls’s justifiable rejection of the
global-state idea as unstable follows a similar argument by Kant: “The first step is
uncontroversial. Almost every theorist joins Rawls in accepting Kant’s thesis that a
global government would be either perpetually unstable or intolerably oppressive.”
Wenar, supra note 93, at 108; see also IMMANUEL KANT, THE M ETAPHYSICS OF
M ORALS 121-26 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (rejecting the cosmopolitan
idea).
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theory.101 Since Walzer and Rawls share similar conceptions of the
international community as a community of collectives, it is no
surprise that they develop very similar rules, at least with regard to
war.102
In the international original position, national representatives
behind a veil of ignorance would adopt the rule promulgated by this
article, which provides that espionage should serve as the sole means
of enforcing a duty of basic transparency. In this respect, it follows
that Rawls views states, rather than citizens, as the primary agents of
international ethics.103 One of the consequences of this Rawlsian
approach is tolerating decent-yet-non-liberal peoples, which is an
attitude that is unacceptable to cosmopolitans.104 This article does not
attempt to resolve this disagreement (if indeed it is resolvable), as it
will later show that the proposed rule would be endorsed even by a
global social contract constructed on a certain cosmopolitan
approach.105
101. On the Legalist Paradigm, see WALZER, supra note 3, at 58–63.
102. “Community” refers to the normatively neutral definition of a cluster of
proximate individuals or groups. It does not mean to denote the social concept of
community that Rawls rejects. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 91.
On the similarity between Rawls’s and Walzer’s theoretical approaches, see Rex
Martin & David A. Reidy, Introduction, in RAWLS’S LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC
UTOPIA? 12–14 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 2006) (comparing Rawls’s Just
War Theory with Walzer). For Rawls’s focused discussion about Just War, see
RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 82.
103. See Pogge, The Incoherence, supra note 95, at 1744 (juxtaposing Rawls’s
international theory with his domestic theory that endorses normative
individualism domestically).
104. See Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, supra note 95, at 681 (noting that a
cosmopolitan approach is necessarily less tolerant of diverse political traditions
and cultures); see also Pogge, The Incoherence, supra note 95, at 1744; cf. Martin
& Reidy, supra note 102, at 109 (showing that Cosmopolitanism’s ability to
remain pure in theory is a result of individuals representing the theory’s ultimate
units); Pogge, An Egalitarian Law, supra note 95, at 218.
105. See RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 82. Some of the grounds on
which Rawls’s LOP draws ardent criticism involves what may be an overstatement
of Rawls’s predefined goals for his global theory. Rawls’s primary goal is to
prevent the great evils of humanity, such as unjust wars, mass murder, starvation,
and extreme poverty. To Rawls, these are primarily the consequence of political
injustices that result from either the collapse of the basic domestic structure or
international disorder. These dangers, namely extreme instances of political
injustice, are what Rawls intended to tackle with his theory. Some of LOP’s
malcontents pose expectations far beyond those Rawls intended to address. LOP’s
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B. THE GLOBAL ORIGINAL POSITION
This section describes the deliberation process that would
hypothetically occur in the global original position. This hypothetical
process is at the heart of the contractarian moral justification for
peacetime espionage. An international duty of basic transparency,
enforced solely through espionage, is legitimate and morally
justifiable since all well-ordered peoples would be expected to
endorse it under terms of impartiality and fairness. This proposition
is derived from a more general rule, according to which impartial,
rational, reasonable nations would accept reasonable limitations on
their sovereignty, provided that such limitations likely promoted
peace and stability and all other states also observed these
limitations. Theoretically, the proposed rule could also be derived
directly from the international original position. As the rule
represents a momentous choice for limiting state sovereignty in
exchange for enhancing world peace and stability, it may be general
and abstract enough to be derived directly from the original position.
While on the domestic level the original position produces basic
institutions, the global original position generates basic rules.106
Rawls takes a similar tack in suggesting that the key rules of just war
and the right of self-defense should be part of the basic principles of
the LOP, which are endorsed directly in the global original
position.107
more moderate goals may suggest a first, intuitive link to espionage, since
espionage may justifiably target some of the very same large-scale evils.
106. See Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, supra note 95, at 673 (explaining this
distinction as resulting from the domestic focus on individuals versus the
international focus on groups of persons).
107. See RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 82, at 672 (listing the eight key
principles of the Law of Peoples). Espionage enables the basic trust that is essential
to implementing all of the other terms and conditions of the global social contract.
Thus, espionage does not only draw its justification from the global social contract;
it also serves as a precondition for the very stability of the global social contract
under non-ideal conditions. The SALT agreements offer a good example. These
treaties were negotiated under “Rawlsian-like” conditions as both superpowers had
effectively reciprocal positions. Both powers faced the problem of monitoring
performance. They both chose not to interfere with the “monitoring mechanisms”
that—the effective equivalents of espionage—the agreements put into place. This
unusually and powerfully demonstrates the role that espionage can play toward
enabling minimal trust and maintaining stable treaties. See Michael Herman, Ethics
and Intelligence After September 2001, 19 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 342, 344
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In the international original position, impartial representatives
represent all nations. These representatives are ignorant of any
information about their respective nations that might affect their
ability to make impartial decisions.108 Representatives do not know if
their state is liberal or non-liberal, large or small, rich or poor, weak
or powerful.109 Potentially splitting the original-position deliberations
into liberal and non-liberal sessions is extremely problematic despite
Rawls’s assertions.110 The outcome that would have decent, nonliberal peoples agree to the LOP in a separate forum is also
incoherent. This set of rules would supposedly be offered to the nonliberal nations on the basis of respect and reciprocity; but respect and
reciprocity would not entail allowing non-liberals to be heard within
the deliberative process. In Rawls’s view, liberal and non-liberal
peoples lack a common political culture to the extent that they would
be unable to conduct a joint deliberation process.111 According to
Rawls, the notion of public reason is quite foreign to representatives
of non-liberal states.112
This position seems to contradict the fundamental idea behind the
original position, namely that deliberations should take place in a
pluralist setting. 113 This incongruity does not escape Rawls’s
readers.114 Nevertheless, the article’s objections to Rawls’s
“separatism” are limited because both versions of the international
original position, Rawls’s segmented version and the proposed
unified one, would endorse the justification of peacetime
(2004) [hereinafter Herman, Ethics and Intelligence] (discussing the SALT
agreements and the related agreements that followed that recognized the role of
espionage in enforcing international commitments).
108. Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, supra note 95, at 691.
109. Marta Soniewicka, The Problem of Global Distributive Justice in Rawls’s
The Law of Peoples, 17 DIAMETROS 45, 50-51 (2008).
110. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 82.
111. Cf. Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, supra note 95, at 682 (emphasizing that
common culture is essential to motivate support and sacrifice for institutions).
112. Id.
113. See Soniewicka, supra note 109, at 48 (noting the necessity for respect of
other societies’ autonomy); cf. Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, supra note 95, at
675-76 (informing the reader that the Law of Peoples must be considered in two
steps: first from the perspective of liberal societies and then from the perspective
of decent non-liberal societies to account for differing viewpoints).
114. See Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, supra note 95 (questioning whether the
exclusion of some societies is potentially problematic).
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espionage.115
Under the unified global original position’s conditions of ignorant
blindness, when the state representatives engage in designing basic
rules for the international community, they are also providing the
boundaries between sovereignty and transparency. Given the rational
maximin approach that they can be expected to adopt under these
conditions, representatives of all states would endorse a rule that
imposes on states a duty of basic transparency regarding their
strategic intentions, a duty that states enforce solely through
espionage. This rule would demand that the process by which each
state makes strategic decisions that affects its proximate neighbors’
security must be clear and observable. If a state violates the duty of
transparency, the remedy available to proximate states would be
limited to espionage. Such instances of legitimate espionage would
be confined to clarifying non-transparent strategic intentions.
Considering the momentousness and irreversibility of a state’s
choices in the original position and the importance of the competing
interests involved—i.e., sovereignty versus peace and stability—risk
aversion is a rational strategy. It would be rational for national
representatives to first seek to secure their nations’ fundamental
interests and, only once this goal is achieved, to set a more general
target of maximizing average utility.116 For these purposes, a nation’s
most fundamental interests are territorial integrity, political
sovereignty, and the preservation of the nation’s way of life and
political doctrine.117
In the international original position, national representatives face
a choice between endorsing and rejecting a duty of basic
115. As noted earlier, Rawls believes that the original position must be divided
into two different phases because liberals and non-liberals lack a common political
language to a degree that would frustrate any joint process of deliberation. This
approach could trigger extremely undesirable conclusions. It might lead to
rejecting humanity as a political common denominator in its own right.
116. Section IV.F. addresses a utilitarian objection to the maximin rule of
decision and Rawls’s contention that the maximin principle is superior to the rule
of average utility.
117. This article does not ignore Rawls’s assertion that liberal states have no
real comprehensive doctrine. Nevertheless, it refers to the political or religious
doctrines of non-liberal states (“decent states” in Rawls’s terms) and to the liberal
political system as equals. Each represents a basic structure that nations feel is in
their supreme interest to preserve.
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transparency enforced exclusively through espionage. If they reject
this rule, states will not be required to be transparent and their
neighbors will have no right to spy on them. The representatives are
expected to adopt a maximin strategy: to choose the option that
offers the best minimum result. If states rejected this proposed rule
on espionage, liberal nations will be worst off. Non-liberal nations
can reject the duty of transparency more comfortably than liberal
nations. Liberal nations are inherently transparent regardless of any
such rule so non-liberal nations would not be threatened by their
(transparent) liberal neighbors.118 In the absence of a duty of basic
transparency, non-liberal states can avoid unacceptable liberal
structural elements. Under the same circumstances, liberal,
transparent states would be trapped in the paralyzing situation of
living in proximity to non-transparent neighbors.119
Alternatively, states could adopt the proposed rule, which
prescribes a duty of basic transparency enforced strictly through
espionage. Given the blindness and uncertainty that characterize the
international original position, each representative knows that he or
she represents either a liberal or a non-liberal nation.120
Representatives see that non-liberal nations, if forced to adopt the
proposed rule, would be worse off than liberal nations. Liberal
nations, which are inherently transparent and would be allowed to
spy on their non-transparent neighbors by the rule, would be placed
in an advantageous position.121
A rational representative would weigh the two alternatives. The
118. An important issue is whether non-liberal states might feel threatened by
other non-liberal, non-transparent nations. Would this type of threat make them
less keen on rejecting an international duty of transparency? If the transparency of
their neighbors could only be achieved at the cost of being transparent themselves,
non-liberal nations would reject the bargain. The transparency of their non-liberal
neighbors is important to their security and prosperity, but it is not as valuable as
their interest in preserving their political doctrine. This kind of non-liberal doctrine
cannot reasonably be preserved if a state adopts structural transparency.
Additionally, under the terms of the original position, non-liberal nations cannot
propose terms to other (non-liberal) nations that they would not themselves accept
and therefore cannot expect other (non-liberal) nations to accept.
119. Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, supra note 95, at 676.
120. See id. at 674 (discussing the “veil of ignorance” behind which people in
liberal democratic societies and nonliberal societies live).
121. Id. at 676.
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representative might represent a liberal nation without a duty of
transparency and thus does not have the right to enforce transparency
through espionage. Alternatively, he or she might represent a nonliberal nation in a world that does impose a duty of transparency
although states only enforce this duty through espionage. Between
the two minimum outcomes, the latter is more advantageous. A
liberal nation living in a world without a duty of transparency and
without the ability to spy would be unable to protect its most
fundamental interests. Its security would be in continuous danger.
Coping with this risk would consume enormous defensive costs and,
in some cases, lead to a rational, preventive use of force.122
In contrast, a non-liberal nation living in a world that imposes a
duty of basic transparency, enforced solely through espionage, would
successfully secure its most fundamental interests. Its security would
not be jeopardized.123 It would be able to preserve its political
structure and the dominance of its religious or political doctrine. It
could join the community of nations and could effectively sidestep
the obstacle posed by being inherently non-transparent when
engaging with liberal nations. Permissible espionage by liberal
neighbors would enable non-liberal nations to become basically
transparent without being forced to adopt liberalism-style
transparency. Most importantly, the transparency generated by
espionage would grant the non-liberal nation freedom from political
intervention and liberal political imperialism.
The upshot of the international original position is that rational,
reasonable, and impartial national representatives, deliberating under
conditions of blindness and uncertainty, will endorse a rule that

122. See Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations
and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 625, 635-36 (2007) (highlighting the
inverse relationship between information and conflict: when information gathering
goes up, the chance of conflict goes down).
123. For several reasons, the basic interests of a non-liberal nation would not be
jeopardized as a result of legitimate espionage against it. First, the activity of
espionage by proximate liberal nations confers more security on the non-liberal
nation because it precludes foreign intervention and the use of force that could
result from non-transparency. Second, it allows the non-liberal state to contend
with the non-transparency of its own neighbors. Finally, the legitimate activity of
counterintelligence and the inherent limitations on permissible spying diminish
both the scope of espionage and the harm that it entails.
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enacts an international duty of basic transparency that states will
enforce exclusively through espionage.124 This choice would
maximize minimal results and secure the fundamental interests of all
impartial, well-ordered nations.
The advantages of espionage as a bridge between liberal and nonliberal peoples seem almost obvious. This leads to a constructivist
question. If the “espionage in return for non-intervention” bargain
between liberal and non-liberal nations is so rational and reasonable,
what is the reason for these nations not agreeing on it ex ante, in a
hypothetical original position, and ex post?125 The original-position
device would seem unnecessary. This question assumes that
espionage reflects a consensus between liberal and non-liberal
nations, one that is independent of state representatives’ awareness of
the nature of the states, which they represent.126 If this assumption
were true, the entire contractarian structure would be redundant. An
impartial contractarian approach is, however, necessary.
Some non-liberal nations may not agree to the proposed rule ex
post even though their “ignorant” representatives would accept it ex
ante. Non-liberal states that possess supreme military power, such as
today’s China or the former USSR, may not accept the “espionage
for non-intervention” bargain because their military might protect
them against intervention even without political concessions. China’s
representative, therefore, would have no reason to accept the rule on
espionage once outside of the original position.127 Because of its
superlative military and economic power, no state can seriously
attempt to impose an undesired political structure on China by way
of external intervention.128 On the other hand, in the original position,
124. In other words, transparency would be enforced through espionage only
and not by any other means, like political or military intervention
125. See Simon Chesterman, The Spry who Came in from the Cold War:
Intelligence and International Law, 6 (Inst. Int’l Law Justice, Working Paper No.
9, 2006).
126. In other words, the constructivist question reflects the argument that even
if reasonable, real (rather than hypothetical) representatives of the various states
were to convene, without imposing on them any Rawlsian ignorance, they would
likely agree to a rule that adopts a duty of basic transparency and limits its
enforcement to espionage.
127. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 122, at 634-35.
128. Id.
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in which representatives are unaware of the exact nature, size, and
capabilities of the states they represent, they can be expected to adopt
the rule. Therefore, only in a Rawlsian process of hypothetical,
impartial deliberation would a state overcome international
controversy and reach a consensus on the legitimacy of peacetime
espionage.129

C. LIMITING LEGITIMATE ESPIONAGE
This section takes on another facet of the international original
position deliberations on espionage: the issue of the limitations that
would be set on legitimate espionage. Espionage would be permitted
for the specific purpose of enforcing transparency and facilitating
international trust, cooperation, and stability. The means employed in
pursuing intelligence should not jeopardize the very same ends that
justify espionage in the first place.130 Extreme intelligence-gathering
tactics, such as those that involve coercive recruitment or disregard
for the lives and safety of intelligence operatives, might prove
counterproductive. Therefore, the global original position
deliberations would likely limit espionage activities in a similar
manner as Rawls describes for the rules of war:
The aim of war is a just peace, and therefore the means employed must
not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a contempt for human
life that puts the safety of ourselves and of mankind in jeopardy. The
conduct of war is to be constrained and adjusted to this end. The
representatives of states would recognize that their national interest, as
seen from the original position, is best served by acknowledging these
limits on the means of war.131

The potential counter-productivity of espionage has at least three
different aspects. One is the issue of excessively harmful means of
129. Id. In this respect, my approach supplements the views of Sulmasy and
Yoo on the international regulation of espionage—by way of an international
convention, for instance—Sulmasy and Yoo argue that such regulation would be
counterproductive, whereas I argue that a convention of this sort would most likely
be unrealistic. The political controversy over transparency between liberal and
non-liberal nations will likely frustrate any attempt to reach consensus in this area
except by way of a (hypothetical) fair and impartial process.
130. Id. at 634 (reminding the reader that the two nations still must reach an
agreeable settlement).
131. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 98, at 332-33.
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espionage. The second is the legitimate scope of espionage.132 The
third is a potential paradox: espionage seeks to enforce transparency
in international relations and, at the same time, is a massive
clandestine and inherently non-transparent activity.133 Finding
optimal limitations on espionage deserves a much more thorough
review than the scope of this article allows. This article, however,
will briefly outline some key points derived from the global original
position.
The following propositions seek to ensure that espionage does not
become counterproductive on four different levels. First, states may
use peacetime espionage only against non-transparent regimes.
Typical liberal democracies would not therefore be legitimate targets
of peacetime espionage. Moreover, espionage would be permitted
only for continuously clarifying an adversary’s strategic intentions.
The proposed rule thus reduces espionage activities dramatically.
On the second level, the potential counter-productivity of
espionage concerns limitations on the means in which states employ
intelligence-gathering. A list of safeguards for intelligence agents
must be formulated. Every national representative would likely
endorse such a list to avoid counterproductive espionage. In fact,
such a list already exists.134 The representatives of all nations already
have endorsed a set of limitations on states’ dealings with
individuals: the set of basic international human rights.135
During peacetime as opposed to times of emergency, basic
international human rights reflect the limits of sovereignty and of
non-intervention.136 The freedom that states enjoy in their
interactions with individuals ends precisely at the borderline as
defined by basic international human rights. These rights are so
fundamental that no peaceful arrangement between well-ordered
132. Herman, Ethics and Intelligence, supra note 107, at 351
133. Id.
134. See Elizabeth Sepper, Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence
Sharing, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 151, 183-85 (2010) (listing prohibitions on torture and
arbitrary detention).
135. Id.
136. In times of emergency, basic human rights are subject to a general rule of
necessity, as in the case of permissible torture in the face of a “ticking bomb.” This
proposition is typically uncontroversial, except to extreme absolutist deontological
approaches.
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societies would be worth respecting if it allowed for their violation.
These rights include the right to life and the right not to be subjected
to enslavement or torture.137 Any basic international rule that violates
these rights or ignores them would be paradoxical: it would be an
arrangement that aims to eliminate the greatest evils of human
society while simultaneously allowing states to engage in such
evils.138 Again, a thorough review of the restrictions imposed on
peacetime espionage by basic international human rights would be a
project of its own. This section will briefly outline a few preliminary
thoughts about the boundaries of peacetime espionage with respect to
risking the lives of agents, coercive handling, and the use of
manipulation and deception.
On the third level, states and intelligence organizations will likely
distinguish between risks inherent to espionage and risks that are not
essential to spying but only materialize as a result of how states
engage in espionage. In contrast, for instance, the risk of discovery is
inherent to espionage despite preparing extensively and executing a
Human Intelligence (“HUMINT”) operation.139 The risk of an agent
being killed once intentionally exposed by the handlers, either as
punishment or as a means of guaranteeing silence, is a function of
the practice of espionage and not necessary to verifying the
intentions of the target state. A reasonable representative in the
global original position cannot expect other representatives to
endorse this kind of risk, which is gratuitous as far as the underlying
goal of enforcing basic transparency is concerned.140 Another
137. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 3-5, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) arts. 3-5 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
138. See RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 82, at 669 (citing Rawls as
supporting this proposition). For general reviews of international human rights, see
generally TOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL
(2d ed. 1995) (providing general reviews of international human rights); Yoram
Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114-15 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981); JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2006)
[hereinafter DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS]; J. E. S. FAWCETT, THE
APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 46 (1987); B. G.
RAMCHARAN, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
139. Herman, Ethics and Intelligence, supra note 107, at 353.
140. The global original position representatives will likely agree that agents
should be handled in a manner that entails reasonable risks. The clandestine nature
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consequence of the right to life is that exposing an agent in a non–
emergency situation for any reason is also illegitimate. It is
unjustified because it endangers the agent’s life for a reason other
than enforcing basic transparency. This unjustified risk may extend
the duration or effectiveness of an intelligence operation and may
therefore contribute to enforcing basic transparency. However,
human rights serve as a limiting principle for this exact situation.
These rights draw an absolute line that cannot be crossed for
apparent gains in productivity.141
The same line of argument applies to coercive recruitment and
handling. For example, as opposed to a victim of a one-time robbery,
a coerced intelligence agent is subject to incessant, unremitting
coercion. The services rendered under coercion are a form of
servitude and servitude is obviously a moral wrong.142 Coercive
handling violates articles 4 and 5 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which provide that “[n]o one shall be held in slavery
or servitude” and that “[n]o one shall be subject to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”143 While forced
handling could conceivably contribute to enforcing transparency, it
would do so by means that international representatives would deem
counterproductive per se because it violates basic international
human rights.144
The case of manipulation and deception is far more complicated.
For the sake of simplicity, this article assumes that people have a
moral right for others not to lie to them; a right derived from a more
general duty not to lie.145 This may result in people asserting a moral

of this practice, however, opens the door for possibly more severe risks to agents.
Handlers must not take advantage of the agent’s inferior position, once recruited,
and of the clandestine nature of handler-agent relations to blackmail the agent or to
punish him, for example.
141. It is worth clarifying again that this article does not mean to exclude the
possibility that such rights might be undermined in times of emergency and under
the guidelines of necessity.
142. UDHR, supra note 137, art. 4.
143. Id. arts. 4-5.
144. See Sepper, supra note 134, at 180 (citing torture, disappearance, and
detention as serious and constant risks of espionage).
145. James Edwin Mahon, Kant and the Perfect Duty to Others Not to Lie, 14
BRIT. J. HIST. PHIL. 653, 674 (2006).
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claim that the state should not lie to them. Moreover, assume that
individuals can legitimately demand the enforcement of this right,
both vis-à-vis their own state and vis-à-vis any other state, including
the intelligence-gathering state. Even assuming that these
propositions are true, they do not preclude manipulation for
intelligence-gathering purposes. Even if the right not to be lied to is
widely recognized, it is nonetheless not a basic, international, human
right. Consequently, it cannot constrain state action in the
international arena. Lying to an agent during recruitment or handling
may violate the agent’s rights, but it still would not violate the
agent’s basic international human rights.
To clear up any possible inconsistency, this article clarifies the
difference between coercion and manipulation. Like Arnold and
Rudinow and unlike Haring, this article rejects the argument that
holds manipulation to be a form of coercion.146 These are two
different practices and have different moral consequences. 147
Manipulation is not coercive but rather sophisticated and gentle.
Whereas manipulation relies on deception, coercion is crudely
transparent. The manipulator and the coercer have entirely different
general ideas and practical plans.148 These distinctions may be seen
146. See BERNARD HÄRING, ETHICS OF MANIPULATION: ISSUES IN MEDICINE,
BEHAVIOR CONTROL AND GENETICS (1975); see also JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 179-80 (1984) (supporting the distinction between
manipulation and coercion); Joel Rudinow, Manipulation, 88 ETHICS 338, 339
(1978) (claiming that manipulation is much more delicate and sophisticated than
crude coercion). See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard
Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 84 (1981) (espousing the view that manipulation is a
form of coercion).
147. Denis G. Arnold, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 53,
60 (2001) (“Manipulation differs from coercion in at least two respects. First, in
cases of manipulation the manipulator need not retain a coercive will . . . the
coercer must have an effective desire to compel his or her victim to act in a manner
that makes efficacious the coercer’s other-regarding desire . . . in cases of
manipulation, . . . this desire need not be coupled with an effective desire to
compel his or her victim to act in a manner that makes efficacious the coercer’s
other-regarding desire”).
148. It is important to the manipulator that the victim voluntarily adopts the will
that the manipulator seeks to impose. This is why commentators generally deem
manipulation to be less severe—preferring sophistication over force and
preference-twisting over compulsion. Rudinow, supra note 146, at 339
(“Manipulation seems delicate, sophisticated, even artful in comparison with the
hammer-and-tongs crudity of coercion”).
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in the different moral reactions to coercion and manipulation.149 One
reason we attribute lesser moral and legal severity to manipulation,
as compared to coercion, is the relative rarity of coercion. All people
engage in manipulation; for instance, when a husband tries to
convince his wife to stay in when an important ballgame is on TV;
when parents try to get their children to eat better; or when one
friend tries to boost the spirits of another by painting an overly
optimistic picture of the future.

149. Id. (“Coercion alone among the three provides one with an excuse. If one
does something prima facie wrong, merely to say ‘I was persuaded to do it’ or ‘I
was manipulated’ is never enough to excuse; but if one has been coerced, one is
excused.”).
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By contrast, coercion and compulsion are more rare.150 If
manipulation and deception—but not coercion—are permissible
practices in international espionage, this does not mean that they are
recommended or justified practices. It does mean, however, that
manipulation will be easier to justify on other compelling grounds.
Under non-emergency circumstances, coercion would violate basic
human rights and other factors would not be weighed against it.151
In short, espionage should be allowed in peacetime only against
non-transparent regimes and only to the extent necessary to clarify
the strategic intentions of these states vis-à-vis their proximate
neighbors. When states conduct this sort of legitimate espionage,
they must respect basic international human rights.152 Yet, it seems
reasonable to demand that espionage should have more restrictive
limits even if it does not violate any basic international human rights.
The idea that State A may collect all possible information about State
B because of State B’s non-transparency seems misguided. After all,
espionage is an instrument for enforcing a duty of basic
transparency, namely a duty that, by definition, is limited in scope.
The international original position would thus constrain justifiable
150. Another way to coherently treat “coercion” and “manipulation” differently,
rather than rejecting the idea that manipulation is a form of coercion, would be to
view coercion as a gradable phenomenon. Indeed, scholars who view both
manipulation and deception as forms of coercion tend to view coercion as
gradable. On such views, manipulation is a moderate version of coercion. On the
other hand, others like Denis Arnold see coercion, duress, and manipulation as
distinct and view coercion as non-gradable. See Martin Gunderson, Threats and
Coercion, 9 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 247 (1979) (defining the different degrees of
coercion); see also Robert Nozick, SOCRATIC PUZZLES (1977); Michael Gorr,
Toward a Theory of Coercion, 16 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 383, 385-86 (1986) (claiming
that coercion can arise by either action or inaction). But see Arnold, supra note
147, at 56-57, 59 (laying out the elements coercion, manipulation, and duress as
three distinct phenomena). See generally Robert Noggle, Manipulative Actions: A
Conceptual and Moral Analysis, 33 AM. PHIL. Q. 43 (1996) (laying out the
differences between manipulation and deception).
151. The issue of physical pressure in interrogations is a good example. While
states are willing to balance the evil of manipulation against its attendant benefit of
information-extraction, they commonly refuse to debate the merits of torture
except in times of supreme emergency, such as the case of the “ticking bomb.”
152. A catalogue of basic international human rights would include similar
rights to those included in the UDHR. See UDHR supra note 137, art. 3
(guaranteeing all people the right to life, liberty, and security); see also RAWLS,
LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 82.
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espionage through a rule of minimal intrusion. This rule would limit
espionage to the minimal level that creates the effect of a basically
transparent adversary, one that cannot strategically surprise its
neighbors. Since typical liberal democracies may be considered
structurally transparent, they indicate the level of transparency that
states may be required to display. The degree to which typical liberal
democracies expose their citizens to their strategic decisions provides
the upper limit of legitimate espionage. Further, the rule of minimal
intrusion serves to restrain the means that states may permissibly use
to carry out legitimate espionage missions, even within the
permissible range. The rule dictates a duty to apply the least intrusive
means that would effectively pursue the objective of transparency. 153
For example, this suggests that SIGINT should be favored over
HUMINT because SIGINT is commonly perceived as less
intrusive.154
Therefore, the hypothetical assembly of representatives will likely
agree to non-ideal adaptations to the basic rule proposed on
espionage to prevent the over-collection of intelligence. Hypertransparency might be as detrimental to peace and stability as hypotransparency. Basic cooperation and peace might be impossible in a
world in which every state knows everything about its neighbors.
153. Eric H. Singer, Book Note, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 350, 371
(1994) (reviewing W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING
COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION
ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW (1992) and ALLAN E. GOODMAN
& BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ, THE NEED TO KNOW: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON COVERT ACTION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1992)).
154. For this reason, Geoffrey Demarest excludes SIGINT from his definition
of espionage. Christopher Baker follows suit, insisting that SIGINT is typically
“rare as territorially intrusive.” A caveat is necessary, however, at this point.
SIGINT and all other methods of non-human intelligence might be as dangerous as
human intelligence under certain circumstances, as the case of Garry F. Powers
demonstrates. See generally GREGORY W. PEDLOW & DONALD E. WELZENBACH,
THE CIA AND THE U-2 PROGRAM, 1954-1974 (1998); Christopher D. Baker,
Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 1091, 1093–94 (2003); Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International
Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 324 (1996); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Some
Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 Incidents, 56 AM. J. INT’L L. 135 (1962);
Robert S. Hopkins, An Expanded Understanding of Eisenhower, American Policy
and Overflights, 11 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 332 (1996).
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Such a system of international relations would be as unsustainable as
an apartment building in which nothing is private and each tenant
knows everything about all of the neighbors. The legality of
domestic counterintelligence serves to restore balance to the
equation. It prevents over-collection and leads to effective selfimposed restraints on international spying. It puts a price on spying
and deters states from engaging in spying except when it is necessary
and cost-effective.
While spying targets hypo-transparency, counterintelligence seeks
to alleviate hyper-transparency. The two activities in tandem should
maintain an optimal range of states’ transparency toward their
proximate neighbors. This new perspective on the relationship
between espionage and domestic counter-espionage may suggest a
solution to a paradox that has puzzled contemporary commentators
on customary international law: espionage seems to be both legal and
illegal at once.155 This article proposes that espionage and counterespionage are not logically incoherent activities; rather, they form a
coherent dual-head mechanism that maintains the necessary
minimum and maximum levels of state transparency.
The fourth dimension in which espionage is possibly counterproductive concerns its clandestine nature. It might seem irrational to
draw on a clandestine, non-transparent activity to address hypotransparency. However, this objection is erroneous. In nontransparent regimes, hypo-transparency exists from the get-go and
espionage can only serve to increase transparency levels. In other
words, espionage only comes into play under circumstances in which
the secrecy that it targets poses a greater security risk than the
secrecy that attends it.
The secrecy that accompanies espionage is less likely to endanger

155. Some scholars find international espionage is legal: Roger D. Scott,
Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L.
REV. 217, 217 (1999); Demarest, supra note 154, at 330. Others consider it illegal:
Ingrid Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT’L L.
53, 61-62 (1984); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as
Political Offenses Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65, 79 (1964).
In contrast, for those who view espionage as neither legal nor illegal, see John
Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 595, 597 (2006); Baker, supra note 154, at 1094.
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peace and stability than the secrecy that it targets in hypo-transparent
states. This argument may be formulated in terms of the wellestablished distinction between deep secrecy and shallow secrecy.156
To illustrate this distinction, let us posit two proximate parties, A and
B, and let us assume that B is keeping a secret from A. B’s secret is
“deep” if A is unaware of its substance and the very fact that the
secret exists—i.e., if A is ignorant of the fact that A does not know
the content of the secret. In contrast, B’s secret is “shallow” if A is
aware of its existence but does not know its substance. In the latter
case, A knows that she does not know the content of the secret.157 In
this sense, a hypo-transparent state’s concealed aggressive intentions
are a deep secret: the state’s adversary does not know whether such a
secret exists, let alone its content.158 On the other hand, clandestine
espionage conducted in accordance with the proposed framework
would be a shallow secret. A hypo-transparent state would know that
foreign collection activities target its non-transparency. It would also
know what such collection activities aim to unearth. The only
remaining secret would be the practical details of these collection
efforts, such as when, where, and how they are carried out. 159 In
short, the level of uncertainty is dramatically less than the
uncertainty that would otherwise envelop the strategic intentions of a
non-transparent state. This conclusion—that the secrecy of
intelligence (a shallow secret) is less destructive than the secrecy of
strategic intentions (a deep secret)—is consistent with the thesis
proposed by David Pozen, which provides that shallow secrecy is

156. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2010).
157. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive
Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 493 (2007); Adam M. Samaha,
Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention,
53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 920 (2006) (providing examples of deep secrecy as
contrasted with shallow secrecy).
158. If the target state were aware of a plan to attack it, the plan would be a
shallow secret. However, such circumstances would no longer generate the
prospect of peacetime espionage.
159. In other words, a given non-transparent state would be aware that its
liberal neighbor is spying on it to overcome its inherent non-transparency.
However, the details of this collection activity would remain a secret, namely who
collects what kind of information and how and when collection efforts are carried
out.
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more benign than deep secrecy.160

D. RISKS OTHER THAN SURPRISE AGGRESSION
The only objective of a legitimate target for peacetime espionage
is enforcing a duty of basic transparency against hypo-transparent
proximate states. In other words, hypo-transparency of proximate
states is the only concern that justifies peacetime espionage.
Therefore, it is important to examine other concerns that may result
from proximity between states and confirm that none, other than
hypo-transparency, offers legitimate grounds for peacetime
collection efforts. For instance, such concerns may include the risks
of environmental or economic harms. Assuming both are not
marginal, intentional harms and unintentional harms must be clearly
distinguished. If any potential harm caused by a proximate state,
including non-military harm, is known and intentional—a known,
intentional emission of radiation, for instance—it is ipso facto a form
of aggression; and thus, the rule of necessity permits espionage. 161
Espionage under these circumstances is not peacetime espionage. On
the other hand, if a proximate state might cause an unintentional
injury, such as an unintended emission of radiation, there would be
little sense in espionage—which would be targeting a potential act of
which the adversary is unaware. In both of these cases, a justification
for peacetime espionage seems unnecessary.162 The only other risk
that may generate a legitimate need for peacetime espionage is that
160. See Pozen, supra note 156, at 275-322 (analyzing secrecy and deep
secrecy as they relate to the utilitarian theory, the liberal democratic theory, and
the constitutional theory).
161. See BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION, THE
SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 547-53
(1975) (providing a general overview on the history of the definition of aggressor);
D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (2009) (setting forth
the characteristics of the right of self-defense); Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining
Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It’s Going, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 491, 500-02
(1972) (discussing legitimate use of force).
162. What starts out as an unplanned harm may turn into an intentional act
when non-transparency is involved. Retaliatory espionage may be legitimate under
such circumstances on the basis of the necessity-based rule that permits espionage
in states of emergency. A good example is the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Soviet
hypo-transparency transformed what began as an unplanned injurious act into
circumstances akin to an intentional harm. Emergency-based collection efforts
consequently became justified.
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of an unknown intentional harm, military or otherwise. This risk
arises when State A has no information that State B intends to harm it
but also has no information that State B has no such intention; in
other words, it arises under the circumstances of typical peacetime
non-transparency.
Another type of risk that states may be interested in monitoring
through collection efforts is the risk of harm to human values in
general, such as large-scale violations of human rights. A state that
engages in large-scale human-rights violations is an “outlawed” state
in Rawlsian terms. In fact, according to both Kant and Rawls, such a
state may not constitute a “state” or a “people” in their respective
terminologies.163 Naturally, a mass violation of basic human rights
should be classified as a state of emergency. Therefore, collection
efforts under such circumstances should be evaluated as emergency,
necessity-based espionage, not as peacetime espionage.

E. BETWEEN EMERGENCY AND ROUTINE
This article draws heavily on the distinction between states of
emergency and ordinary, peaceful ones. This distinction is important
because each dictates a different justification for espionage activities.
During peacetime, espionage is legitimate under a hypothetical
international social contract and in well-defined circumstances.
During times of emergency, the justification for espionage rests on
the rules of necessity. This section further illuminates this
distinction. First, it offers a practical row concept of emergency to
better define “emergency” and “peacetime.” Next, it explains some
of the moral implications of the differences between the two
justifications for espionage, the global social contract and necessity.
It is difficult to formulate a complete definition of national states
of emergency. National emergencies can take many forms. War or
the declaration of war is a prototypical state of emergency. The
prospect of an armed attack is also one. A direct threat against a
group of citizens—created by a terrorist attack, for example—is
another. One way to think about the significance of such
emergencies is to analyze its link to remedial rights or remedial
163. Compare Kant, supra note 100, § 43 [AK 6:313], with RAWLS, LAW OF
PEOPLES, supra note 82, at 60-61 (defining differently what constitutes a state).
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justifications. States generally have primary rights to political
sovereignty and territorial integrity. International-relations
emergencies endanger these rights and require remedial action
against potential rights-violators.164 In other words, emergencies are
directly linked to necessity. For the sake of this discussion, an
emergency is a situation that creates an urgent need for remedial
action.165 Such remedial action is costly but not as costly as
refraining from action.
The notion that necessity may justify or excuse an act that would
otherwise be proscribed originates in the theory of criminal law.166
There is no reason why a similar analysis should not apply to the acts
of nations.167 Necessity will usually justify an otherwise
objectionable act when the act prevents a harm that greatly exceeds
the harm that the act itself entails. On the other hand, where there is
little or no discrepancy between the moral costs and benefits of an
act, necessity serves only as an excuse from liability. An emergency
situation renders the problematic, excusable act understandable,
though not desirable. Whether necessity serves as a justification or
merely as an excuse generally depends upon the other requirements
of “last resort” and “imminence.”168 These requirements demonstrate
that the rules of necessity are inadequate as governing principles for
peacetime espionage. A justificatory framework intended to deal
with immediate, isolated events cannot justify a long-term,
164. See CHAIM GANS, A JUST ZIONISM: ON THE MORALITY OF THE JEWISH
STATE 45 (2008) (describing the distinction between remedial justifications and
primary rights).
165. See id.
166. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759-876 (2000)
(explaining the theory of necessity in criminal law).
167. For a collective application of the rules of necessity within a moral
argument, see Gans’ treatment of necessity as a justification for Zionism. GANS,
supra note 164, at 37-51.
168. See generally NETA C. CRAWFORD, The Justice Of Preemption and
Preventive War Doctrines, in JUST WAR THEORY: A REAPPRAISAL 25-48 (Mark
Evans ed., 2005); Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The
Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213,
216 (1998); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War and Humanitarian Intervention, 17
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2001); Christopher Greenwood, International Law
and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 926, 931 (2000);
Guy B. Roberts, New Rules of Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of
Additional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 109, 116 (1985).
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continuous endeavor.169
Emergency times and ordinary times call for very different sources
of legitimacy. In turn, these different sources of legitimacy—
necessity versus the social contract—entail divergent moral
consequences. One example of this divergence involves the right to
resist legitimate action. If the right to spy is derived from the rules of
necessity, it is subject to the debate over whether a state may
legitimately resist a justified act. Therefore, the fact that espionage is
legitimate on the basis of necessity may dictate the legitimacy of
counterintelligence by the target state: if State A’s spying against
State B is legitimately grounded in the rules of necessity, State B’s
counterintelligence might be unlawful. For example, George Fletcher
concludes that it is morally wrong to resist an act that is justified on
grounds of necessity.170 On the other hand, Fletcher argues that
resistance may be permissible when necessity is merely an excuse.
Joshua Dressler criticizes Fletcher’s view on the illegitimacy of
resisting a justified act.171 One of the implications of the proposed
justification for peacetime espionage is that objections to resisting
justified acts do not apply since this justification does not rely on
necessity. If the source of espionage’s legitimacy is the global social
contract, there is no reason why espionage and counterintelligence
should not be permitted.
169. Taking a similar approach, Alon Harel and Assaf Sharon reject the
regulation of torture by way of legislation. To Harel and Sharon, such regulation
would amount to treating emergencies as routine and conflating the exceptional
with the ordinary. See Alon Harel & Assaf Sharon, What Is Really Wrong with
Torture?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 241 (2008).
170. A clarification is necessary to avert a potential misunderstanding
concerning the legitimacy of spying during a war or an emergency. Ostensibly, if
spying is justified on grounds of necessity, it follows from Fletcher’s argument that
only the state conducting a just war is justified in spying because an unjust nation
that spies is equivalent to resisting a justified act. This is obviously wrong.
Wartime spying is justified not as a right to resist the spying of another nation but
as a lesser evil in a situation in which the use of force would be permissible as
well. Therefore, both parties to a war can justifiably spy on each other. This
justification for espionage does not carry over to peacetime. If the rule of necessity
justified the right to spy in peacetime, a state may not legitimately resist a justified
act.
171. See Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in
the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 61, 61 (1984); GANS, supra note 164, at 49.
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F. THE UTILITARIAN ARGUMENT
While this article has certainly rejected the traditional utilitarian
approach to justifying espionage, it deliberately left the utilitarian
argument out of the discussion of existing justifications for
espionage. Rawls was right to argue that rational, non-gambling
original-position representatives would not adopt the goal of
average-utility maximization as a fundamental decision-making
principle. It would be extremely irrational for representatives to
accept the risk of representing a minority that might be required to
sacrifice its fundamental interests for the sake of overall utility.
Many utilitarians, however, attack Rawls on this point. Some, like
John Harsanyi, argue against Rawls’s presumption that a maximin
approach would prevail.172 Harsanyi asserts that original-position
representatives would endorse a rule of decision-making that
maximizes average utility. 173 Others argue that Rawls’s maximin is
itself a utilitarian instrument:174 This view provides that Rawls’s
requirement that states secure basic interests before the maximization
of overall utility is only a matter of the specific utility function that
the approach seeks to maximize, and not a matter of whether the
approach is utilitarian.
Naturally, the scope of this article does not allow for
comprehensively discussing this controversy. It is noteworthy that
most utilitarian opponents of the maximin rule find that its results are
similar on the whole to those of an average-utility-maximization
rule: Harsanyi and, to a greater extent, Kenneth Arrow argue that the
maximin and utilitarian principle of average utility have “very
similar practical consequences.”175 This does not mean that the
theoretical debate over the relative merits of maximin and average
utility is unimportant, but it implies that it has little, if any, impact on
justifying espionage. In practice, it seems relatively easy to argue
172. Ken Binmore, Social Contract I: Harsanyi and Rawls, 99 ECON J. 84, 88
(1989).
173. See id.; John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for
Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594 (1975).
174. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 107-10 (Erin Kelly
ed., 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
175. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s
Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 255 (1973); Harsanyi, supra note 173, at 60506.
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that peacetime espionage carried out in accordance with the proposed
rule would also maximize average utility.176 The argument would run
as follows: espionage, though injurious, is morally justified because
it benefits the aggregate wellbeing of mankind. Intelligence allows
states to avoid unnecessary wars caused by uncertainty and riskaversion, optimize global defense costs, discourage surprise attacks,
and increase international cooperation.177 It enables adversaries to
conduct secret communications when conventional diplomacy fails.
It also offers a mechanism for the enforcement of international
treaties by providing information about treaty violations.178 In so
doing, espionage promotes international cooperation by ensuring that
international treaties carry practical significance. Therefore, in the
international original position, both representatives acting on Rawls’s
maximin rule and representatives acting on a rule of average utility
would endorse the proposed rule for espionage although for different
reasons. More generally, neither cosmopolitans nor Rawlsian
contractarians should be taken aback that the deliberative processes
they propose embody utilitarian principles. The contractarian process
of decision-making produces a legitimate, justifiable rule for
conducting peacetime espionage. If utilitarians accept its reasoning
and outcomes, then that is for the better, as Rawls stated.

176. Kahn, supra note 57.
177. See id. at 84-85, David Kahn, Clausewitz and Intelligence, 9 J. STRATEGIC
STUD. 117 (1986) [hereinafter Kahn, Clausewitz]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 46 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS],
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 271 (1981) [hereinafter POSNER,
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE]; Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 746-47 (2007). If
espionage is viewed as an anti-privacy action, one might argue that the arguments
against the efficiency of privacy support the efficiency of espionage. This
conclusion is, however, clearly non-trivial: it must show that the analogy between
personal privacy and state secrecy is valid.
178. ANGELA GENDRON, ETHICAL ISSUES: THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN PEACE
SUPPORT OPERATIONS (2003) [hereinafter GENDRON, ETHICAL ISSUES]; HAZI
KARMEL, INTELLIGENCE FOR PEACE: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN TIMES OF
PEACE (1999); Lawrence E. Cline, Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement
and Stability Operations, 15 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 179
(2002); Bradley Runions, American and British Doctrine for Intelligence in Peace
Operations, 24 PEACEKEEPING & INT’L REL. 14 (1995).
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G. THE COSMOPOLITAN APPROACH TO ESPIONAGE
As noted above, a controversy rages in moral debates on global
justice between the approach offered by Rawls’s Law of Peoples and
the cosmopolitan approach. The proposed rule does not depend on
the outcome of this controversy because it can be accepted and
justified by reference to a cosmopolitan approach of global justice. 179
More specifically, impartial, fair representatives of all nations’
citizens would endorse the proposed rule for espionage. Thomas
Pogge and Allen Buchanan offer a similar approach to applying
Rawls’s original position on a global scale.180 Richard Brandt
constructed a similar cosmopolitan original position to argue for the
legitimacy of the rules of just war.181
In the cosmopolitan original position, the representatives of the
world’s citizens follow the same policy of “lexically” securing more
important interests first. Representatives who are aware that they
represent a citizen of either a liberal or non-liberal nation are more
likely to endorse the proposed rule than a representative of the state
itself. This assumes that some citizens of non-liberal nations oppose
the “ruling” doctrine and would prefer to live under a liberal
structure. Thus, representatives of citizens are somewhat less
concerned than representatives of nations about preserving the nonliberal doctrines of non-liberal nations. Therefore, they are in a better

179. The word “cosmopolitan” might be slightly misleading. This article
discusses a cosmopolitan format for the global original position: one that does not
necessarily reflect cosmopolitan opinions. For instance, the representatives in this
original position do not necessarily endorse cosmopolitan views about the role of
nations; they do not necessarily reject the idea that states are international moral
agents.
180. Allen Buchanan, Taking the Human Out of Human Rights, in RAWLS’S
LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 76, 81-84 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Buchanan, Taking the Human Out]; Thomas Pogge, Do
Rawls’s Two Theories of Justice Fit Together, in RAWLS’S LAW OF PEOPLES, A
REALISTIC UTOPIA? (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 2006) [hereinafter Pogge,
Rawls’s Two Theories] (discussing the nexus between Rawls’s two theories);
Pogge, Cosmopolitanism, supra note 94; Pogge, The Incoherence, supra note 95;
POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS, supra note 97, at 5 (exploring the political relevance of
the approach taken by those for whom the practical social task is primary); Tan,
The Problem, supra note 93, at 93.
181. See R. B. Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
145, 145 (1972).
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position to adopt a rule that espionage should be permitted as an
international instrument for enforcing transparency.182
Hypothetical representatives of citizens have a unique, important
concern: each representative may, in fact, represent a recruited
intelligence operative. Once again, each representative will seek the
most beneficial option among those that secure his or her basic
interests. Acting on this strategy, a representative will opt for the rule
that permits transparency-enforcing peacetime espionage while
abiding by the state’s general duty to respect basic international
human rights. This option would secure the citizen’s interest in world
peace and stability. Unless a minimal level of peace and security is
attained in the international sphere, a reasonable representative must
assume that no domestic right is guaranteed.183 Choosing the
proposed principles also ensures that the benefits of international
peace and stability do not expose an individual citizen to irrational
risks—if the represented person is an agent —because the right to
spy is subject to the duty to respect basic international human rights.
Note that the precise menu of international human rights is
controversial. Rawls’s LOP, for instance, defends a much shorter list
of rights than the typical cosmopolitan seeks to protect. 184 However,
this controversy does not affect the proposed rule, as the human
rights relevant to espionage, such as the right to life, are the most
fundamental of all. All reasonable catalogues of human rights would
protect these rights.185

182. Even in this cosmopolitan version of the international original position, the
basic premise remains that the representatives elect basic rules, not basic
institutions, for the international community. This premise eliminates the prospect
of the representatives adopting global institutions expected to impose
constitutional liberal democracy on the entire international community.
Notwithstanding the cosmopolitan approach , representatives are deemed to be
choosing rules for the international community as it is, not as it should be.
183. Kant, supra note 100, at § 44 [AK 6:312].
184. See Buchanan, Taking the Human Out, supra 180 (setting forth rights
contained in Rawls’s Law of Peoples).
185. While the controversy over the scope of international human rights may
not affect the justification for espionage as a whole, this controversy might affect
the legitimacy of some of the means that the state may use to gather intelligence.
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H. ON PROXIMITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLUSTER
Proximity has been a constitutive element of this article’s
argument: it is the combination of proximity and non-transparency
that ignites the state of unsustainable vigilance and permits the
solution of transparency through espionage. However, if the
justification for espionage relies on proximity, it might seem that
only states situated within short geographical distances of each other
should be permitted to collect intelligence against each other. This
interpretation of proximity is clearly erroneous. Proximity is a
practical concept and must be interpreted as such. The definition of
proximity offered above relies on many practical parameters,
including geography, military technology, economic welfare, and
logistics. For the sake of this argument, State A is proximate to State
B if the aggregate outcome of these parameters suggests that State A
is capable of inflicting intentional harm against the vital interests of
State B. The implications of these parameters are subject to
continuous change depending on timing and circumstances. State A
may find State B is proximate even if a thousand miles of ocean lie
between them if, for instance, State A sits on an island and State B
has a powerful navy. Proximity also depends on technology. State B
may only become proximate to State A at the moment it acquires
long-range surface-to-surface missiles or develops aerial refueling
capabilities that would enable it to carry out airstrikes at a new,
extended range.186
This argument offers a window into the future of espionage.
Generally speaking, airstrike and missile capabilities tend to expand
continuously, thus increasing the range within which states may be
considered geographically proximate.187 More and more nations
therefore come to share a new status—neighbors—with respect to
186. John Newhouse, The Missile Defense Debate, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 107
(2001). See generally STEVEN A. HILDRETH & CARL EK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
Rl34051, LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE (2008)
(examining country relations based on their long-range missile technology).
187. Taking Iran’s relations with the EU as an example, Iran achieving the
ability to launch missiles with a range sufficiently long enough to target some
European countries has obviously affected these countries’ attitudes toward it.
They no longer consider Iran to be a distant country. Newfound missile
technologies have transformed Iran into a “neighbor” whose non-transparency is
cause for great concern.

1068

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:5

models of peace and stability. As more and more states become
proximate neighbors, interest in intelligence collection will
presumably grow as well. In other words, the proliferation of military
technologies will likely lead to more states identifying each other as
proximate and thus new targets for espionage. This process should
persist as long as a speedier process of democratization does not
offset it.
These two processes—the proliferation of long-range military
capabilities and democratization—flow in opposite directions. The
former extends the range of proximity and therefore increases the
number of potential collectors and targets of intelligence. The
latter—democratization—has the opposite effect because states will
likely refrain from collecting intelligence against transparent regimes
regardless of whether these regimes acquire long-range military
capabilities. As it is reasonable to assume that democratization will
not be as swift as the proliferation of long-range military capabilities,
international espionage will likely grow over time in prevalence and
importance. This forecast highlights the importance of fashioning a
sound justification for intelligence collection. The rapid development
of technologies for transportation, communication, and the military
reshapes the world. Ironically, in its reshaped form, the world seems
smaller. If this article’s argument is sound, the smaller the world
gets, the more transparent it must be.

V. CONCLUSION
This article joins a vast literature that addresses the value of
information from different angles.188 In the case of espionage, the
188. See generally Jerome Bracken & Richard Darilek, Information Superiority
and Game Theory: The Value of Information in Four Games, 31 PHALANX 6, 6-7
(1998) (discussing the Information Age, and its role in the US military); M.P.
Carter, The Valuing of Management Information: Part I: The Bayesian Approach,
10 J. INFO. SCI. 1 (1985); Harlan Cleveland, Information as a Resource, 16
FUTURIST 34 (1982) (relaying the shift from resources being concrete things to
intangible information); Vincent P. Crawford, Lying for Strategic Advantage:
Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 133 (2003) (analyzing the strategic rationale of lying); Gerald A. Feltham,
The Value of Information, 43 ACCT. REV. 684 (1968); Ronald W. Hilton, The
Determinants of Information Value: Synthesizing Some General Results, 27
MGMT. SCI. 57 (1981) (elucidating the normative structure for information
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information at stake concerns the strategic intentions of proximate
states. This information must be available to achieve international
peace and stability. This essential information about strategic
intentions underpins the proposed duty of basic transparency. This
article takes the additional step of connecting peacetime espionage,
the essential duty of transparency, and the political structure of
government. Typical liberal democracies are sufficiently transparent.
Their political institutions correspond to the structural demands of
transparency. As obeying an international duty of basic transparency
would seem to call for adopting certain liberal democratic elements,
non-liberal nations would likely reject this duty. Espionage is an
instrument through which the international community enforces the
essential duty of basic transparency. It allows for non-liberal states to
achieve transparency without imposing a liberal political structure on
them.
If this proposal is sound, empirical evidence of it would appear in
the real world. For instance, the structure of intelligence
communities worldwide would respond to this portrait of espionage.
Non-transparent regimes should construct their intelligence
communities differently than their democratic counterparts. If
democratic states are typically transparent about their deliberations
and intentions, their adversaries will likely allocate fewer resources
to defensive intelligence and intelligence analysis.189 Indeed,
intelligence communities in democracies—as David Kahn
analysis); S. J. Ho, Extracting the Information: Espionage with Double Crossing,
93 J. ECON. 31 (2008) (discussing extracting information and espionage); Morton
I. Kamien et al., On the Value of Information in a Strategic Conflict, 2 GAMES &
ECON. BEHAV. 129 (1990) (explaining the value of information in a decision
theoretic framework); Karen B. Levitan, Information Resources as ‘Goods’ in the
Life Cycle of Information Production, 33 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 44 (1982)
(addressing the significance of information resources as the basis of an
“information and knowledge-based society”); Theodore J. Mock, Concepts of
Information Value and Accounting, 46 ACCT. REV. 765 (1971) (discussing the
importance of and potential of information in planning and decision-making);
Aatto J. Repo, The Value of Information: Approaches in Economics, Accounting,
and Management Science, 40 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 68 (2007); Merrill E.
Whitney & James D. Gaisford, An Inquiry into the Rationale for Economic
Espionage, 13 INT’L ECON. J. 103 (1999).
189. Kahn, supra note 57, at 84-86; see BARRY R. POSEN, THE SOURCES OF
MILITARY DOCTRINE: FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND GERMANY BETWEEN THE WORLD
WARS (1984).

1070

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:5

confirms—tend to invest more heavily in collecting and analyzing
foreign intelligence because democratic nations do not tend to attack
their neighbors by surprise, while autocracies tend to underestimate
these pursuits.190 Indeed, the divergent structures of intelligence
communities demonstrate differences in transparency and
deliberative processes. Typically, in democratic states, organizations
for central analysis are larger and more powerful than their nondemocratic counterparts; their missions are far more complicated and
the consequences of an erroneous analysis on their part are far more
serious.191
This article tells a new story about contemporary espionage. This
story may help envisage the future of espionage: the offered
prognosis is that the clash between democratization and the
proliferation of long-range weapon systems will shape international
espionage. As democracy spreads, fewer nations will be the targets
of espionage, espionage will diminish, and fewer individuals will be
involved in spying. In this sense, spying is a strange profession—one
whose system of ethics will achieve its zenith when the profession is
abolished. Until that day, most states will continue to keep their eyes
and ears wide-open toward their non-transparent neighbors.
Hopefully—and with help from the burgeoning moral discourse on
espionage—the individuals involved in spying will keep their hearts
similarly open.

190. Kahn, supra note 57, at 86.
191. Herman, Assessment Machinery, supra note 8, at 100-12.

